Transcript
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Welcome back to Semis Popery.
欢迎回到 Semis Popery。
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I'm Joe Heschmeyer, and I want to explore the question of whether an American Catholic revival is underway or whether the American Catholic Church is dying, because if you do something like Google Catholic Church droves, at least in my experience, the top two results are a video explaining why Catholics are leaving the church in droves and why young men are joining the Catholic Church in droves.
我是 Joe Heschmeyer,我想探讨一个问题:美国公教是否正在复兴,还是美国公教会正在走向衰亡?因为如果你去 Google 输入「Catholic Church droves」这样的关键词,至少在我的经验里,排在前两位的结果是:一个视频解释为什么公教徒正大量离开教会,另一个视频说明为什么年轻男性正大量加入公教会。
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And you might be saying, Well, which of those is right?
你可能会问:那到底哪个说法才对呢?
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And the answer, in part, is both of them.
部分答案是:两种说法都对。
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So it's not just, you know, the first two videos you pull up when you Google this.
所以,这不仅仅是你在 Google 搜这个时看到的前两个视频。
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You'll find all sorts of seemingly contradictory sources about this.
你会发现各种看起来相互矛盾的消息来源。
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So recently, the New York Post had a piece on young people converting en masse to Catholicism and told some of the personal stories.
最近,《纽约邮报》刊登了一篇文章,说有许多年轻人集体皈依公教,并讲述了他们的一些个人故事。
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But then you also have articles like Eric Salmon's article about how for every 100 new Catholics, 800 people are leaving the Catholic Church in America and that the numbers are actually even worse, somehow, than that sounds, fittingly for Crisis magazine.
但也有像 Eric Salmon 的文章指出,在美国,每有 100 名新公教徒加入,就有 800 人离开公教会,而且数据实际上比听上去还要糟,这篇文章恰好刊登在 Crisis Magazine。
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And even my friend and colleague Trent Horn did a video recently on why, he says, Protestantism is winning and the lesson this provides for Catholics.
甚至我的朋友兼同事 Trent Horn 最近也做了一个视频,他说新教正在「赢」,这对公教徒有什么启示。
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Now I want to agree with everybody in part and disagree with everybody in part on this, because it's not just the kind of headlines that can cause this confusion.
在这个问题上,我部分同意每个人,也部分不同意每个人,因为造成这种困惑的不只是吸引眼球的标题。
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It's also when you get into the data.
更重要的是,当你真正深入数据时也会出现混乱。
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So Trent and Eric and people who are focusing on, uh, some of the alarming signs are largely looking at a Pew Research study that came out in February of this year, and although it's called Decline of Christianity in the US has slowed, may have leveled off, nevertheless, the article has some pretty ugly news for the state of the Catholic Church in America, namely that bit about how for every 100 people who join, some 840 people have left Catholicism for something else.
Trent、Eric 以及关注这些令人担忧迹象的其他人,主要引用的是皮尤研究中心今年二月发布的一项研究。虽然报告题为「美国基督宗教的衰落速度已放缓,可能趋于稳定」,但文章里对美国公教会却给出了令人难看的数字:每有 100 人加入,就有大约 840 人离开公教,投入别的群体。
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The largest recipient of this isn't actually Protestantism.
接受这一流失人数最多的其实并不是新教。
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Mostly this is people becoming religiously unaffiliated.
大多数人是变成了无宗教信仰者。
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In fact, Protestantism is struggling as well, just not nearly as much as American Catholicism when you look at, when you look at those numbers.
事实上,新教也在艰难维持,只是和美国公教会相比,情况没那么糟。
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Other numbers, though, tell a somewhat different story.
不过,其他一些数据却讲述了另一番故事。
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Now this is tricky because it's not, uh, systematically organized, but I know that The Pillar has done, Luke Coppin in particular, has done good work of just gathering evidence at a diocese by diocese level about the number of adult baptisms, and what we're seeing in many cases is that adult baptisms are way up.
这就有点棘手,因为数据并没有系统地整理。但我知道 The Pillar —— 尤其是 Luke Coppin —— 做了一项很好的工作,他们按教区收集了成人洗礼的数字。结果显示,许多地方的成人洗礼人数大幅上升。
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I'll get more into that data in a little bit.
稍后我会更详细地谈这些数据。
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But I just want to kind of pose the question, what do we make of all this?
但我想先提出一个问题:我们该如何看待这一切?
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Are we seeing a revival?
我们是在见证一次复兴吗?
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Are we seeing the death of Catholicism in America, or is it something a little more complicated?
还是在见证美国公教的衰亡?抑或情况更复杂?
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And as you might guess, I'm gonna say a little more complicated, although I do think there are authentic, good, reasonable grounds for hope that a, a real revival is happening quietly and in its early stages.
正如你可能猜到的,我的看法是:情况的确更复杂。不过,我相信确实有正当、合理的理由抱有希望——真正的复兴正在悄悄地、处于早期阶段地发生。
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Sort of too soon to say for sure, but we're seeing a shift underfoot.
要下定论还为时过早,但我们确实感觉到脚下正在发生变化。
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But to get there, we have to know how to parse through the data, and this is tricky for a few reasons.
但要弄清楚这一点,我们必须知道如何解读数据,而这因为几个原因变得不太容易。
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The first is that while Protestantism is divided into evangelical and mainline Christians, when you look at, like, Pew Research data and other research data, usually it's actually, uh, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, and historically Black Protestants, because these groups, even though they're all under the broad umbrella of Protestant, are pretty different sociologically and they operate in different ways.
首先,新教内部通常分为福音派和主流派基督徒。如果你查看皮尤研究中心或其他机构的数据,往往还会分出历史上黑人新教徒这类群体。虽然它们名义上都属于新教,但在社会学上差别很大,运作方式也不同。
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That's gonna be really important because Catholicism doesn't have those official distinctions.
这一点非常重要,因为公教内部并没有官方的这种区分。
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You don't, you know, go to a Catholic Church and it says, We're a mainline Catholic Church, or, We're an evangelical Catholic Church.
你走进一家公教堂时,门口不会写着:「我们是主流派公教堂」或者「我们是福音派公教堂」。
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But nevertheless, we can have a little bit of something similar.
不过,我们内部还是可以看到类似的差异。
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It's gonna be different in some important ways as well.
在一些关键方面,情况同样会很不一样。
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But to get a sense, here's Redeemed Zoomer, who is himself a more conservative or evangelical Presbyterian who attends a mainline Presbyterian Church, explaining, um, kind of from his perspective what those differences look like, and obviously this is not gonna be super favorable to someone from more of a liberal perspective.
为了让大家有个概念,下面请看 Redeemed Zoomer 的说法。他本人是比较保守、偏福音派的长老宗信徒,却在主流长老宗教会聚会;他将从自己的角度解释这些差异。在持自由立场的人看来,这段话显然不会太友好。
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Additionally, he is a Zoomer, so of course he's doing this while playing Minecraft, so if you hear a weird clicking sound, that's what's going on.
另外,他是 Z 世代,所以当然会边玩《Minecraft》边讲话;如果你听到奇怪的点击声,就是那个原因。
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So for those of you who don't know, um, I'm a Presbyterian, and there are a bunch of Presbyterian denominations in America, but there's two main ones.
如果你还不知道,我是长老宗信徒。美国有好几个长老宗宗派,但主要有两个。
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There's the PCUSA, Presbyterian Church USA, which is the more, it's the more liberal one, and the PCA, the Presbyterian Church in America, which is the more conservative one.
一个是 PCUSA(Presbyterian Church USA),比较自由;另一个是 PCA(Presbyterian Church in America),比较保守。
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And I'm more conservative, so it makes sense that I would be in the PCA, right?
我比较保守,所以按理说我应该属于 PCA,对吧?
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There's a reason why I'm not, why I'm in the PCUSA instead of the PCA. So really, it's because the PCUSA is the original one.
我之所以不在 PCA 而是在 PCUSA,是有原因的:PCUSA 是最早的那个宗派。
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It's what's called a mainline Protestant denomination because it's the, like, it, there used to just be the Presbyterian Churches.
它被称为主流派新教宗派,因为过去就只有长老宗教会。
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There wasn't, like, mainline and evangelical denominations.
当时并没有主流派和福音派的区分。
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That distinction came about when the mainline Protestant churches in all brands, Presbyterian, Methodist, Lutheran, Baptist, Episcopal, they all started to become more theologically liberal.
后来,长老宗、循道宗、路德宗、浸信会、圣公会等各主流派新教教会在神学上变得更自由化,这才出现了主流派与福音派的区分。
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Um, and that's not quite the same as politically liberal, as I always say.
我常说,这和政治上的自由派不完全一样。
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Theologically liberal means they don't take the claims of Christianity as seriously, and they don't really care if people actually believe in it.
神学自由化意味着他们不再那么认真对待基督信仰的宣称,也不太在乎人们是否真的相信。
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Um, it's, becomes more of just, like, going through the motions, and the only thing they really care about is social justice, um, that they sort of redefine the Gospel as that.
结果就变成只是走过场,他们唯一真正关心的是社会正义,甚至把福音重新定义成这个。
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Um, so when the mainline denominations became more theologically liberal, the evangelical denominations were basically a bunch of conservative outcasts who split off, who ran away, and who started their own things.
因此,当主流派宗派在神学上趋向自由时,福音派宗派基本上就是一群被排挤的保守派分裂出去、自立门户。
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So it's no exception for Presbyterians.
长老宗也不例外。
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The PCUSA, Presbyterian Church USA, is the original Presbyterian denomination, and the PCA, the Presbyterian Church in America, is a denomination that was formed by a bunch of conservatives who got frustrated with the PCUSA becoming more liberal and who split off.
PCUSA 是最早的长老宗宗派,而 PCA 是一些对 PCUSA 日益自由化感到不满的保守派分裂出来后建立的宗派。
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So one of the reasons this matters is that what we're looking at in the data isn't necessarily the death of Catholicism in America.
这之所以重要,是因为我们在数据里看到的并不一定是美国公教会的消亡。
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It seems much more to be the death of mainline or liberal Christianity in America, and we see this by looking quite clearly at the trajectories of the two different groups of Protestants.
更像是美国主流派或自由派基督教的衰亡,从两类新教徒的发展轨迹就能看得很清楚。
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So remember, the Pew Research stuff, uh, from 2025 breaks out evangelicals, historically Black Protestants, and mainliners, and in particular, it finds that while there's this overall downward trend, it has stabilized It hasn't affected everyone equally.
还记得皮尤研究中心 2025 年的报告吗?它把新教分成福音派、历史上的黑人新教徒和主流派。报告指出,虽然总体呈下降趋势,但现在趋于稳定,而且并非所有群体受影响程度相同。
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So Evangelicals went from being 26% of the population to 23% of the population.
福音派的比例从人口的 26% 降到 23%。
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That's a relative decline of about 11%.
这是大约 11% 的相对下降。
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For those of you who don't understand relative decline, if you go from being 2% to 1% of the population, you've lost half of your membership.
如果你不懂相对下降,举个例子:从 2% 掉到 1%,等于损失了一半成员。
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You haven't lost 1%. So relative decline is the better measure to use when you're seeing how much did something grow or shrink by, um, in looking at like the health of the organization.
并不是只少了 1%。所以在评估一个组织的兴衰时,相对变化是更好的衡量方式。
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So Evangelicals are about 11% smaller now, relative for overall population growth, et cetera, et cetera, than they were in 2007.
因此,考虑到人口总体增长等因素,如今的福音派比 2007 年相对缩小了大约 11%。
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But in that same time period, mainline Protestants have just bottomed out.
但在同一时期,主流派新教徒几乎跌到谷底。
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They've lost just shy of 40% of their members.
他们损失了接近 40% 的成员。
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They were 18% of the population, they're now 11% of the population.
他们原本占人口的 18%,现在只剩 11%。
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That is, as we're gonna see, a worse decline, uh, than Catholicism has experienced.
正如我们将看到的,这个跌幅比公教会经历的还要严重。
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So that suggests this isn't a Catholic/Protestant issue.
这表明问题并不是公教与新教之争。
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This is much closer to a theologically liberal versus theologically conservative issue.
而更像是神学自由派与神学保守派的差异。
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Another way you can get there is Pew also asks people about whether they consider themselves liberal or conservative, and so just as you've got a clear difference in the trajectories of mainliners, who are dying, and Evangelicals, who are struggling but surviving.
还有一个角度:皮尤也问受访者自认为是自由派还是保守派。正如我们看到主流派在衰亡、福音派虽艰难却仍存活的截然不同走向。
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Well, similarly, you have a slight decline, uh, among conservatives and a shocking rate of decline among liberals.
同样,保守派的下降幅度有点小,但自由派的跌势却非常惊人。
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So in the words of the Pew study, 37% of self-described liberals today identify with Christianity.
用皮尤研究的话来说,如今只有 37% 的自称自由派人士认同基督信仰。
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That's down from 62% in 2007.
这个比例在 2007 年是 62%。
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So they call that a 25-point decline, but it's obviously bigger than that in terms of relative decline, that in 2007 if you were to approach, say, three liberals, probably two of them would be Christian.
他们把这称作下降 25 个百分点,但按相对跌幅算显然更大:2007 年如果你随机遇到 3 个自由派,大概有 2 个是基督徒;
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Today, one of them would be Christian.
今天,3 个人里只有 1 个是基督徒。
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That's a big decline.
这可是巨大的下滑。
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Additionally, most liberals now report having no religion, 51%, compared to, uh, 27% in 2007.
此外,现在多数自由派表示自己无宗教信仰,高达 51%,而 2007 年只有 27%。
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So okay, now you approach four rather than three.
好,咱们把人数从 3 个改成 4 个来想像。
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If you approached four liberals and said, What's your religious affiliation?
如果你问 4 个自由派:「你的宗教信仰是什么?」
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chances are one of them in the past would have said nothing.
过去大概只有 1 个人会说「没有」,
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Now two of them would say that.
现在会有 2 个人这么回答。
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So this is a pretty striking case that there are now more religious nones, so unreligious or unaffiliated people, um, than Christians among the population just of liberals.
也就是说,在自由派人群里,无宗教人士已经超过基督徒,这非常惊人。
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This is unprecedented.
前所未见。
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So you can see all of that in the data.
这一切在数据里都看得出来。
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In the m- meantime, 89% of conservatives back in 2007 described themselves as Christian.
与此同时,2007 年有 89% 的保守派自称是基督徒,
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Today, 82%.
如今是 82%。
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So you still have a decline, but it is a way smaller decline.
虽然也在下降,但幅度小得多。
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So if you think about this not in terms of Catholic/Protestant things, but in terms of liberal/conservative both politically or more importantly theologically, then you can see, I think, a, a much better explanation for the data.
所以,如果把视角从公教/新教转换到自由派/保守派——尤其是在神学上的自由或保守——就能更好地解释这些数据。
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So the difficulty here is we don't have just, as I said before, self-proclaimed Evangelical Catholics and mainline Catholics, but we do see something like this in the numbers.
难点在于,正如我之前说的,我们并没有「自称福音派公教徒」和「主流派公教徒」这种官方分类,但数字里确实可以看到类似的分化。
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And I'll get into how we can get there in just a second.
等会儿我会解释我们怎么得出这一点。
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But first, overall numbers, Catholics went from 24% of the population to 19% of the population.
不过先看总体数字:公教徒在美国人口中的比例从 24% 降到 19%。
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Now that is a 21% decline, and actually the real relative decline is worse than that because some of that is immigrant, like immigrants coming in from other places where they were already Catholic.
这意味着 21% 的跌幅,而且真实的相对跌幅更糟,因为其中有一些是已经是公教徒的移民,并不是新近皈依。
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They're not suddenly converting.
他们并不是突然改宗而来。
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So if you look at just like the native-born US population, the decline is worse than 20%, but nevertheless, that's kind of where we're at.
如果只看美国本土出生人口,跌幅超过 20%,但大体情况就是这样。
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We fall somewhere in between where Evangelicals are and where mainline Protestants are, which makes sense because if you were to think about Catholics in those terms, you've got a group of Catholics who would be closer to Evangelicals in their view of scripture and theological conservativism and everything else, and then you've got a group that are more akin to what you would call mainliners.
我们介于福音派和主流派新教徒的跌幅之间,这也合理;因为如果用那套分类来看公教,会发现有一群公教徒在对待圣经和神学保守性方面更接近福音派,而另一群则更像主流派。
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So in the same way that if you, you just said Presbyterian, you'd get a kind of misleading number rather than breaking it out into which type of Presbyterian.
就像只说「长老宗」会得到一个模糊的数字,需要拆分不同类型的长老宗才能准确一样,
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The same thing, I think, is happening somewhat with Catholicism.
我认为公教也发生了类似的事情。
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Now a couple months ago, I did a video on liberal Catholicism specifically showing that self-identified politically liberal and theologically liberal priests have all but evaporated.
几个月前,我做过一支关于自由派公教的视频,指出自认为政治上和神学上都自由派的祭司几乎消失了。
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I'm not gonna rehash all of that.
我不会在这里重复那全部内容。
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If you wanna watch that, you can go watch it there, but I will point out one data point that I think points to this in a really profound, kind of shocking way, uh, coming from The Polarization, Generational Dynamics, and Ongoing Impact of the Abuse Crisis study, uh, by the Catholic Project at CUA which found that theologically progressive and very progressive priests once made up 68% of new ordinands.
如果你有兴趣可以去看那支视频,我只想提一个相当震撼的数据点,来自 CUA 的 Catholic Project 发表的《Polarization, Generational Dynamics, and Ongoing Impact of the Abuse Crisis》研究:过去,神学上进步或非常进步的祭司曾占新领受圣秩者的 68%。
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So if you were, uh, go back in the '60s and ask a newly ordained priest how he considered himself, h- he was gonna say progressive more than two-thirds of the time.
也就是说,回到 60 年代,如果你问一位新晋祭司他如何自我定位,超过三分之二的几率他会说自己是「进步派」。
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Today, that number has dwindled to almost zero.
而今天,这个比例几乎降到零。
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It is the low one percent, or w- well, excuse me, low single digits in terms of the, the number who identify themselves today in terms of newly ordained priests as being theologically progressive.
如今自认神学进步的新晋祭司只剩下百分之一出头,甚至是低个位数。
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So liberal Catholic priests have simply failed to inspire a generation of liberal Catholic priests to follow in their footsteps.
自由派公教祭司显然没能激励出下一代走他们老路的自由派祭司。
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That's one enormous data point, but another one actually comes from this book here, Young Catholic America, uh, Christian Smith and his co-authors Kyle Longest, uh, Jonathan Hill, and Carrie Christopherson.
这是一个重要数据点,另一个则来自这本《Young Catholic America》,作者是 Christian Smith 及其合著者 Kyle Longest、Jonathan Hill、Carrie Christopherson。
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This is a little bit older of a book, so I'm hesitant to use it to describe trends in 2024 or 2025, uh, because the book is 10 years old.
这本书有点旧,所以我不太想用它来描述 2024 或 2025 年的趋势——毕竟它已经 10 岁了。
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It's from 2014, but it's looking specifically at what they called emerging adults.
出版于 2014 年,专门研究作者称为「新兴成人」的人群。
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So these were Catholics who at the time were 18 to 23.
也就是当时年龄 18 到 23 岁的公教徒。
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They're now 28 to 33, and they- provided some pretty good data looking just at Catholics in a way that I haven't seen a lot of people do since.
如今他们 28 到 33 岁了,这本书提供了相当不错的、专门针对公教的资料,这是我后来很少见到的。
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And unlike the Pew Research stuff, they break out liberal and conservative in, in a more helpful way.
与皮尤数据不同的是,它把自由和保守区分得更有帮助。
780.49-784.43
It's still not perfect, but it, it's, I think, more helpful for getting a sense of the trajectory.
虽然仍不完美,但我觉得更能看出走向。
784.83-804.09
And what they found across the board, things like church attendance, prayer, even things like self-denial, those teenagers and emerging adults who'd been raised in liberal Catholic homes were way less religious, way less, uh, practicing of anything like Catholicism, than those raised in more moderate or traditional homes.
他们发现,无论是参与弥撒、祈祷,还是克己等方面,那些在自由派公教家庭长大的青少年和新兴成人都远不如中间派或传统家庭的孩子虔诚,也远不常实践公教信仰。
804.35-812.87
Now, there's a whole bit about how you define those terms, but this gives us at least a, an impression of a trajectory, say.
至于这些术语如何定义还有很多细节,但至少给我们描绘了一个趋势。
813.37-818.55
In the words of the authors, they say, The most striking finding is the difference in Mass attendance.
作者写道:「最显著的发现是弥撒出席率的差异。」
819.03-837.23
While 27 and 29% of emerging adults do not attend Mass at all, among those who survey responding parent as traditional or moderate respectively, fully 52% do not attend Mass at all who has a teenager, who as a teenager had a liberal Catholic parent.
在父母被调查者认定为传统或中间派的家庭里,有 27% 和 29% 的新兴成人完全不参加弥撒;可是在父母是自由派公教的家庭,这一比例高达 52%。
837.71-840.51
So let's just make sure you're getting that.
我们先确认你听懂了。
840.51-859.43
At least in 2014, and I think there's good reason we're gonna see this actually stayed pretty stable, uh, across the decades, so I don't think this is radically different today, if you grew up in a traditional Catholic household, there's a good chance you still go to Mass at least some time once you're in college, once you're kind of on your own.
至少在 2014 年,而且很有理由相信几十年来这个趋势相当稳定,今天大概也差不多:如果你在传统公教家庭长大,上大学独立后仍会偶尔去弥撒的可能性相当高。
859.77-861.81
Maybe not as often as you should.
也许去得没那么勤,
862.09-871.17
But, uh, the odds that you're going to Mass not at all are about one in four, maybe a little, a little more than one in four, 27 and 29%.
但完全不去弥撒的几率大约是四分之一,或再多一点——27% 到 29%。
871.61-882.45
On the other hand, if you were raised in a liberal Catholic household, it's slightly better than 50/50 odds that you don't go to church at all anymore, already, I mean, within five years of leaving home.
相比之下,如果你成长于自由派公教家庭,在离家五年内完全不去教堂的概率就超过一半了。
882.71-893.45
And in contrast, only 6% of those who grew up in a liberal Catholic house attend Mass weekly, compared to 17 to 21% of those in a moderate or traditional house.
而且只有 6% 的自由派家庭出身者每周参加弥撒,而中间派或传统家庭则有 17% 到 21%。
893.85-895.33
Now, those are still bad numbers.
这些数字依旧很糟,
895.33-896.55
Don't get me wrong.
别误会,
896.57-898.61
Uh, they should be, everyone should be at 100%.
理想状况当然应该是 100%。
899.35-910.71
But you can see, there is a pretty massive disparity, uh, in terms of, uh, Mass attendance, in terms of, uh, participation in anything related to the faith.
但你可以看到,在弥撒出席率以及任何与信仰有关的参与度上存在巨大的差距。
911.79-916.15
So again, you can get more into the data, because it's not just church attendance.
再说一次,数据不只显示弥撒出席率,
916.15-918.33
It's also things even like personal prayer.
还包括像个人祈祷这样的内容。
918.71-924.77
Um, so all of that suggests that there is a liberal versus conservative trajectory.
所有这些都在暗示:自由派和保守派的轨迹截然不同,
924.87-927.09
Again, theologically primarily is what we mean here.
这里主要指神学意义上的自由或保守。
927.35-931.07
Politically, there's gonna be some overlap, but those don't mean the exact same thing.
在政治上两者会有重叠,但并不完全等同。
932.31-940.93
The second thing I think is worth breaking out is something that I've seen almost everybody get wrong about the Pew Research data, and I would put it like this.
第二点值得拆开的,是我发现几乎所有人都误解了皮尤数据;我会这样表述:
940.93-946.89
I'd say, the bad news is old news, and the good news is new news.
坏消息其实是旧消息,好消息才是新消息。
947.07-948.85
And here's what I mean by that.
我的意思是这样。
948.85-967.45
When you hear these numbers about the number of people joining the Catholic Church compared to leaving the Catholic Church, the impression it creates is that this is how many people have just joined, like, in the last year compared to just left in the last year, and it's often described that way, uh, even by people like my beloved colleague, Trent Horn.
当你听到这些有关加入公教会人数与离开公教会人数的数据时,直觉上会以为这是过去一年里加入与离开的对比。连我亲爱的同事 Trent Horn 在内的很多人都会这样描述。
967.45-976.31
To put it another way, the study says that for every 100 people who become Protestant, 180 people leave Protestantism.
换句话说,这项研究指出:每有 100 人成为新教徒,就有 180 人离开新教。
976.79-990.77
However, for every 100 people who become Catholic, 840 people leave Catholicism, and for every 100 people who become religious, 590 people give up religion.
然而,每有 100 人成为公教徒,就有 840 人离开公教;每有 100 人开始有宗教信仰,就有 590 人放弃宗教。
990.77-997.09
And not to make for a tense situation, but Trent's actually technically wrong there about the tenses.
我并不是想让场面尴尬,但从语态来说,Trent 的说法其实不太准确。
997.11-998.43
And it's not just Trent.
而且不只 Trent 一个。
998.43-1000.61
It's everybody I've seen cover this data.
我看到几乎所有解读这份数据的人都这么说。
1001.09-1008.83
Uh, it's just, I like singling out Trent 'cause I, I like Trent and 'cause I rarely get to get a point over on him, and I'm, I'm happy to try to do so here.
我特别点名 Trent,只是因为我喜欢他,而且难得有机会在他面前赢一分,所以想趁机调侃一下。
1009.33-1016.11
But it's actually not the case that for every 100 people who join the Catholic Church, 840 people leave.
但事实并不是每 100 个人加入公教会,就有 840 个人离开。
1016.11-1018.17
That puts it too much in the present tense.
这种说法把事情过度地放在「现在进行时」里了。
1018.67-1028.77
It's that for every 100 people alive and being surveyed now who have joined the Catholic Church, 840 people have left the Catholic Church.
正确的说法是:在目前接受调查且一生中曾加入公教会的人里,每 100 人对应大约 840 位前公教徒。
1028.79-1051.15
That actually matters a great deal because the whole point, and actually the point Pew is making in their overall study, is that we've seen this massive shift of people leaving Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular, but that massive, like, exodus seems to have slowed quite a bit, which is good news.
这一区别非常重要,因为皮尤研究的核心结论是:虽然过去确实有大量基督徒,尤其是公教徒流失,但这种「大逃离」似乎已经明显放缓,这是好消息。
1051.27-1057.77
But not if you think that the 8.4 to one ratio of, of exiting to leaving is still ongoing.
如果你仍以为 8.4 比 1 的流失率今天依旧在发生,那就无法看见这层好消息。
1057.77-1058.77
It, it's not.
事实上,它已经不是这样了。
1059.13-1060.73
Rather, here's the case.
真实情况是这样的。
1060.73-1066.33
The median age of people that they're, uh, surveying, a- among all US adults, the median age is 48.
在这次调查的所有美国成年人中,中位年龄是 48 岁。
1066.65-1068.31
Among Christians, it's 54.
基督徒的中位年龄是 54 岁。
1068.59-1071.19
Among the religiously unaffiliated, it's 38.
而无宗教信仰者的中位年龄是 38 岁。
1071.57-1083.93
So okay, if you take a 48-year-old, just to take the median example, is it more likely that they grew up in a Christian home and left it or grew up in a non-religious home and became Christian?
所以以 48 岁这个中位数为例,他更有可能是成长在基督徒家庭后来离开信仰,还是成长在无宗教家庭后来皈依基督?
1083.93-1095.33
Well, obviously, it's more likely that they grew up in a Christian home and left it, because historically, uh, we were more of a Christian country, and you see all of that very clearly in the data.
显然,更大的可能性是他原本就在基督徒家庭长大后来离开,因为历史上美国更趋向基督宗教国家,这一点数据里看得很清楚。
1095.67-1100.33
So of course you're going to get more of an exodus to incoming convert rate.
因此,流失人数远高于新皈依者是意料之中的。
1100.63-1101.89
Let's put it like this.
换个说法来比喻。
1102.55-1104.67
Let's just imagine a hypothetical.
假设一个情景。
1105.13-1111.11
Let's say, through a miracle, for the next year, not one person left the Catholic Church.
如果奇迹般地,在接下来一年里没有任何人离开公教会。
1111.23-1113.69
Nobody gave up on being Catholic.
一个放弃公教身份的都没有。
1113.69-1119.31
And let's say the number of people who converted to Catholicism doubles, triples, whatever.
同时,皈依公教的人数翻倍、甚至翻三倍。
1119.39-1131.77
Even in that case, which would be undeniably a revival, undeniably this incredible movement, you would still, at least at first, have a case where there were a lot more former Catholics- than new Catholics.
即便那样——毫无疑问算得上复兴——起初统计时,前公教徒的总数仍会远超新公教徒。
1132.25-1149.85
Because there are more former Catholics over the past decades, so that even if there are new signs of life, if you're just looking at the overall number of everyone, whether they converted a, a week ago or 40 years ago, well, then you're not gonna see that in the data, at least not at first.
因为过去几十年累积了大量前公教徒。即便现在出现新的活力,如果你只看所有人——无论是刚皈依一周还是四十年前皈依——整体数字一时也反映不出来。
1150.39-1158.59
If you wanna put it like this, like if you decide you're gonna get in shape, let's say after a month, you wanna track your fitness goals.
打个比方:如果你决定锻炼身体,一个月后想评估成果,
1158.83-1162.17
Your best bet is to say, Where was I a month ago compared to where am I now?
最好的做法是比较「一个月前」和「现在」。
1162.37-1165.51
If you say, Where was I 20 years ago compared to now?
如果你拿「二十年前」来比,
1165.53-1168.07
that's probably not a very helpful rubric.
那就没有什么参考意义了。
1168.41-1173.57
And so the problem with the Pew data isn't that it's wrong, it's that it's unhelpfully broad.
因此,皮尤数据的问题不是错误,而是范围过于宽泛,难以立刻评估现状。
1173.57-1178.19
Like, it actually tells us something important, but not what people think it tells us.
它确实透露了重要信息,但不是大家以为的那种「现在进行式」信息。
1178.41-1188.73
It doesn't tell us the current state, it tells us the prior state, and as the rest of the Pew data shows, there has been a mass decline in Christianity overall.
它反映的是过去的状况,而非当下;也确实显示了基督宗教总体的大幅衰退。
1188.95-1205.09
But, as they acknowledge, something has happened in the last few years, and we see this actually across demographics, across ages, that, as they put it, since 2020, signs of religious stability across birth cohorts in the United States exist.
但皮尤也承认,过去几年出现了某些变化——他们说,自 2020 年起,美国不同年龄层都出现了宗教稳定的迹象。
1205.59-1216.95
They If you look at the number of people who pray daily, the number of people who describe themselves as Christian, and then the number of people who are religiously affiliated, we see in the last five years something kind of fascinating.
如果查看「每日祈祷者比例」「自称基督徒比例」以及「有宗教归属者比例」等指标,你会发现最近五年出现了有趣的现象。
1217.21-1217.99
It stabilized.
这些数字趋于稳定。
1217.99-1235.33
In fact, the most curious thing is that if you look at the youngest generation, those, uh, aged 18 to 24, the people you would expect to be leaving Christianity in droves, they went from 45% of them self-describing as Christians before to now 51%.
最令人惊讶的是,在最年轻的 18–24 岁这一代——本以为会大量离开基督信仰的人群——自称基督徒的比例竟从 45% 升到 51%。
1235.77-1266.23
And so you actually see among, uh, a couple of the younger cohorts, also the, the cohort of those age 34 to 44, like myself, uh, they're actually more likely to say they're Christian now than they were in 2020, which is all the more remarkable because in there you also have things like COVID. You also have things like, you know, churches shutting down and people being cut off from church attendance and all of this, all this stuff that we thought was gonna be absolutely catastrophic in the numbers, and we don't see catastrophe in the numbers.
而且在另一个年轻群体——34 至 44 岁(我就在其中)——自称基督徒的比例也比 2020 年更高。这就更令人惊奇了,因为这段时间还经历了 COVID、教堂关闭以及无法参加弥撒等,我们原以为数字会惨不忍睹,但事实并非如此。
1266.23-1272.59
Now, to be clear, in the long term it's been pretty catastrophic if you say, What's the last 50 years looked like?
当然,如果拉长到过去 50 年来看,情况确实相当惨烈。
1272.83-1274.85
But if you ask, What does the last five years looked like?
但如果只问「过去五年如何?」
1274.91-1276.93
well, it's surprisingly good.
结果却出人意料地好。
1277.03-1280.85
Surprisingly better than I think any of us would have expected.
好得超乎我们所有人的预期。
1281.37-1300.23
Now, this actually dovetails nicely, uh, with a point that Christian Smith and his co-authors make, which is that what we find in terms of, uh, the story of American Catholics, young Catholics, is that we're dealing with the fallout of a lot of stuff that's been going on since the last 50 years or so.
这一发现也与 Christian Smith 及其合作者的观点不谋而合——美国年轻公教徒的处境,其实是在消化过去大约半个世纪累积的问题。
1300.61-1319.65
So, as they explained, when you compare Catholic young adults, again that 18 to 23 range, in 2014 compared to those in the 1970s, they found that with one huge exception w- there was relatively little change in their religious beliefs, attitudes and practices.
他们指出,将 2014 年 18–23 岁的公教青年与 1970 年代的同龄人相比,除了一个重大例外,二者在信仰观念、态度和实践上变化并不大。
1319.65-1349.17
Like, the popular narrative is the modern generation of Catholics is way less religious than the older generation or vice versa, and at least as of 2014, again before this kind of slowdown, like in the, in the middle of the battle days, before the religious decline stopped, young emerging Catholics were looking a lot like young emerging Catholics in the 1970s but with an important difference, namely, um, mass attendance.
流行说法是现在的公教青年远不如老一辈虔诚,可至少到 2014 年为止,在宗教衰退尚未放缓的「至暗时刻」,年轻公教徒在很多方面和 1970 年代的同龄人相似,唯一重要差异就是弥撒出席率。
1349.71-1354.87
And so this suggests that what we're looking for shouldn't be anything in the last couple years.
这说明我们要寻找问题根源,就不应该只盯着最近几年。
1354.89-1359.77
Like, this is not, oh, this is the story of the new atheism taking everyone away from Christianity.
这并不是「新无神论」让所有人离开基督信仰的简单故事。
1359.77-1360.55
It's not that.
问题不在这里。
1361.05-1370.55
Something else has been going on, and, and Radhine Zimmer pointed it out when he talks about this theological liberalization project that, that happened in the mid-20th century in all these different Protestant denominations.
还有别的原因。Redeemed Zoomer 就提到,20 世纪中叶各新教宗派的神学自由化工程。
1370.55-1377.89
There's a version of that in Catholicism as well, and it's, I would argue, been disastrous, eh, statistically.
公教内部也有类似的版本,而从数据看,其后果同样非常惨重。
1377.99-1382.73
And, um, so the, the one difference that we see as I said before is mass attendance.
正如我先前说的,我们看到的最大差异就是弥撒出席率。
1382.75-1400.53
So you had young Catholics in the 1970s who were so-so in whether they believed in church teaching, and they still often went to mass, and then you have a very similar looking group of young Catholics in the 2010s and they were just less likely to go to mass.
1970 年代的年轻公教徒对教会教导半信半疑,却仍常去弥撒;到了 2010 年代,同样状态的年轻人就不怎么去了。
1400.87-1420.07
And w- when you put it in that 50-year trajectory and you couple it with things, you know, this was Pew in 2014 showing the number of religious sisters and the number of priests, the number of priests went down quite a bit, the number of religious sisters plummeted from 180,000 in 1965 to under 50,000 in 2014.
把这一切放到 50 年的长轴上,再加上皮尤 2014 年的数据显示:祭司人数大幅下降,修女更是从 1965 年的 18 万骤减到 2014 年不足 5 万。
1420.49-1422.83
That's enormous loss.
这是一场巨大的流失。
1423.23-1432.19
And so even if we've stabilized, when you compare it to 1965 or even 2007, things are still going to look bad.
因此,即便如今趋于稳定,与 1965 年或甚至 2007 年相比,情况依旧显得糟糕。
1432.41-1438.51
But if you recognize in a shorter time span, the bleeding may have slowed or stopped.
不过若从更短期来看,出血可能已经减缓,甚至止住。
1439.11-1460.37
The other thing I would add to this, uh, kind of echoing what Christian Smith and his colleagues found is, uh, from The Handbook of Contemporary Christianity in the United States which found that basically boomers even when they dropped out of church still called themselves Christian, whereas younger generations who might believe e- exactly the same things are just less likely to use the label of Christian.
我还想补充一点,与 Christian Smith 等人的发现相呼应:《美国当代基督信仰手册》指出:婴儿潮世代即使不再上教堂,仍自称基督徒;而年轻世代即便信念相同,也更不愿使用「基督徒」这个标签。
1460.65-1464.45
So some of what we're seeing isn't an actual theological difference.
因此,我们看到的某些变化并非真正的神学差异。
1464.95-1475.77
Some of what we're seeing is just how people respond to the theological difference that the person who'd become disaffected with Christianity in the past might still call themselves Christian, might still go to church.
其中部分只是人们对信仰疏离之后的自我认同方式:过去的人即使对基督信仰失望,仍会自称基督徒、偶尔去教堂;
1476.21-1485.85
The person with those same beliefs now is less likely to have the kind of cultural, social ties that keep them attached to the label after they've stopped believing in it.
而现在拥有同样想法的人,不太会有把他们留在「基督徒」标签下的文化与社交纽带。
1486.11-1497.17
So that's some of the bad news, but I wanna couple that with the good news, and, and part of the good news there by the way is that we aren't seeing people just- overthrowing Christianity and rejecting it.
这就是坏消息的一部分,但我也想谈谈好消息,其中一点就是:我们并没有看到人们大规模推翻、抛弃基督信仰。
1497.49-1512.09
They may be more honest about their self-description or maybe more self-aware about their self-description, but we also see, as I say, not just that the, the ratios kind of plateau in a good way, but also these little signs of life.
也许他们对自己的描述更诚实,或对自己更有自知之明。不管怎样,如我所说,不只是那些比例趋于平稳,还有一些生命的迹象在出现。
1512.09-1526.11
Now, I mentioned this earlier, but Luke Coppin at The Pillar has actually admirably done the legwork of just getting different dioceses to report how many converts they had at Easter this year, uh, compared to last year, and the numbers are really heartening.
我刚才提过,The Pillar 的 Luke Coppin 做了辛苦的统计工作,向各教区询问今年复活节与去年相比有多少人皈依,结果相当振奋人心。
1526.47-1532.15
So for instance, the Archdiocese of Baltimore, last year they had 669 people come into the Church.
例如,巴尔的摩总教区去年有 669 人进入教会。
1532.15-1533.89
This year they had 778.
今年则有 778 人。
1534.37-1538.57
Boston, last year, 360, this year 458.
波士顿去年 360 人,今年 458 人。
1539.17-1543.77
Arlington, where I used to live, 242 last year, 291 this year.
我以前住过的阿灵顿,去年 242 人,今年 291 人。
1543.91-1550.11
I also lived in Washington, D.C. They had 1,350 last year, 1,500, more than 1,500 people this year.
我也住过的华盛顿特区,去年 1,350 人,今年超过 1,500 人。
1550.57-1558.67
And my own diocese here of Kansas City St. Joseph in Missouri, 419 people last year all the way up to 424 this year.
而我现在所在的密苏里州堪萨斯城-圣约瑟教区,去年 419 人,今年增加到 424 人。
1558.79-1559.69
Five extra people.
多了 5 个人。
1559.69-1564.91
I mean, look, if we're gonna rejoice over one lost sheep, five lost sheep, that's great.
要知道,如果为一只迷羊都值得欢喜,那五只迷羊就更值得庆祝了。
1564.95-1568.51
So, my point there is that there are actual signs of life.
所以我要说的是,确实有复苏的迹象。
1568.51-1576.31
Like it's easy to just say, Oh, you know, the stats tell a very bad story, and then you just have this anecdotal evidence that tells a positive story.
人们很容易说数据看起来很糟,然后只把这些好消息当作零散的见闻。
1576.31-1578.33
This is something more than anecdotal evidence.
但这已经不只是零星见闻了。
1578.33-1581.63
You at least have dioceses-by-dioceses, year-to-year numbers.
我们手里有逐个教区、逐年统计的数字。
1581.63-1583.23
That's, that's data.
这就是数据。
1583.63-1594.89
Now, we should caveat that data, as, as Coppin rightly does, by pointing out that it might be easier to get this data from dioceses where things are going well, who are happy to report year-over-year numbers.
当然,正如 Coppin 所提醒的,需要给这些数据加上说明:情况好的教区更乐意提供逐年对比的数字,统计上比较容易取得。
1595.19-1601.35
A few dioceses do report, uh, some negative numbers, but overall, this is positive.
也确实有少数教区呈报负增长,但总体仍然是正向的。
1601.81-1604.45
And he also points out year-over-year the downside.
他也提醒了逐年对比的局限。
1604.45-1623.97
You know, I've been talking a lot about you don't wanna spread it out too long, you don't wanna compare 1950 to 2024, 2025, but on the other hand, Coppin points out, well, we are looking just at the last year compared to the year before, and that might be very different from something like 10 years ago.
我一直强调不要把时间跨度拉得太长,不要拿 1950 年跟 2024、2025 年比;但 Coppin 也提醒,我们目前只看去年和前年,对比十年前的情况可能就完全不同了。
1623.99-1630.29
So it's still an incomplete story, but, eh, I think a helpful one that shows that something might be happening.
因此,这个故事仍不完整,但足够说明某些好事正在发生。
1630.53-1637.19
And Coppin has also pointed out, along with Brendan Hodge, that we see some similar numbers in places like France and Belgium.
Coppin 和 Brendan Hodge 也指出,在法国、比利时等地出现了类似的趋势。
1637.59-1651.61
So looking just at adult baptisms in France and adolescent baptisms in France, they're markedly up, not just from last year, but every year that the reporting goes back, which is to 2015, like, up quite a bit.
以法国为例,成人人洗礼和青少年洗礼的数字不仅比去年高,而且自 2015 年起年年上升,幅度相当可观。
1651.71-1655.17
So something is happening, and I think it's really good.
所以确实有事情在发生,而且我认为这是好事。
1655.27-1671.01
Now, the last way I wanna kind of break the numbers apart is by referring to a, a popular narrative that bad Catholics become Protestants and good Protestants become Catholics, and I wanna challenge it in some ways and, and accept it in some ways.
接下来我想用另一种角度来拆解这些数字:流行说法是「糟糕的公教徒会变成新教徒,优秀的新教徒会变成公教徒」。我想部分挑战、也部分接受这种讲法。
1671.01-1678.25
Now, Trent is, uh, skeptical of a version of this claim, and I agree with his skepticism of the version.
Trent 对这种说法的某个版本持怀疑态度,我同意他的怀疑。
1678.57-1680.05
So, here's his argument.
他的论点是这样的:
1680.05-1694.25
Now some Catholics may soothe themselves by saying that smart Protestants become Catholic, whereas the larger number of not-so-smart or less pious Catholics become Protestant, so this is just an issue of quality over quantity.
有些公教徒自我安慰说:聪明的新教徒会皈依公教,而大量不那么聪明或不够虔诚的公教徒则去当新教徒;这只是「质量优于数量」的问题。
1694.75-1697.93
Well, that's a grand claim with little evidence to back it up.
可这是个缺乏证据的夸大说法。
1698.19-1699.67
But suppose it were true.
就算它是真的,
1700.07-1700.87
Why does that matter?
又有什么意义呢?
1701.25-1704.45
A person's worth doesn't come from his or her intelligence.
一个人的价值不取决于智商。
1704.73-1708.11
It comes from the fact that he or she was made in the image and likeness of God.
而在于他或她是照着神的形象被造的。
1708.11-1717.37
So, I agree with Trent that we don't wanna act like the soul of, like, a really smart, well-educated person is worth more than the soul of someone who's not as smart or educated.
因此,我同意 Trent 的看法:我们不能把高智商、受过良好教育之人的灵魂看得比其他人更宝贵。
1717.43-1719.09
I That's totally true.
这一点完全正确。
1719.65-1732.57
But it is nevertheless an important part of understanding what's going on here to recognize that it is also true that people who leave the Catholic Church tend to be way less educated and less well-formed.
但要弄清现象的本质,也必须承认:离开公教会的人通常教育程度更低、信仰塑造也更弱。
1732.59-1746.95
That's not to say that their souls matter any less, but it is to diagnose the nature of the problem, and to suggest some really good news, namely that when people get a full version of the story, then they realize Catholicism is true at a much higher rate.
这并不是说他们的灵魂比较不重要,而是为了诊断问题本质,并带来一个好消息:当人们全面了解公教信仰时,他们更可能认识到公教是真理。
1747.33-1748.89
That's, that's great.
这可是好消息。
1749.11-1756.41
So in 2009, and this was revised in 2011, it's still very old, but this is, uh, the best I could find from Pew.
2009 年(2011 年修订)的一项皮尤研究——虽然年份久远,但已是我能找到最好的数据——
1756.91-1773.33
Uh, they looked specifically at when people leave Catholicism, and what they found is that about half, 48%, of Catholics who are now unaffiliated left Catholicism before reaching the age of 18, compared to a third of those who are now Protestant.
专门研究人们何时离开公教会。结果发现:如今无宗派的人里,有 48% 在 18 岁前就脱离公教;而如今成为新教徒的人中,这一比例为三分之一。
1773.79-1778.97
So, that's a massive drop-off in the teenage years or, or even before.
也就是说,在青少年甚至更早的阶段就出现大规模流失。
1778.99-1791.99
Among both groups, an additional 3 in 10, so 30%, I don't know why they switched from doing percent to ratios, 3 in 10 left the Catholic Church as young adults between 18 and 23, that's the age range Christian Smith is looking at.
两组人中,另有三成(3/10)在 18–23 岁的年轻成人阶段离开公教——这正是 Christian Smith 研究的年龄段。
1792.15-1800.67
Only one-fifth who are now unaffiliated and one-third who are now Protestant departed after turning age 24.
如今无宗派者里只有五分之一、如今新教徒里只有三分之一是在 24 岁以后才离开的。
1801.13-1802.49
That's massive.
这很夸张。
1802.51-1821.57
It means if you can successfully help someone stay Catholic to the age of 24, statistically, they're overwhelmingly likely to remain Catholic for life, and this is at least suggestive that the people leaving, it isn't because they've done some super deep dive on the issue.
换句话说,只要一个人到了 24 岁还留在公教会,他终身保持公教信仰的概率就非常高。这也说明,多数离开者并非做过深入研究后才决定离开。
1821.61-1836.83
No offense to those of you watching who are very young, but there is a difference between the, you know, take the high-profile converts who've spent years studying the question and then convert to Catholicism compared to the teenager who just says, I don't wanna go to mass.
无意冒犯年轻观众,但「花多年研究后皈依公教的知名转信者」与「单纯不想去弥撒的青少年」毕竟是两条完全不同的路。
1836.83-1839.49
My parents can't force me, and then stops going.
毕竟父母也不能强迫,结果就不去了。
1839.99-1846.11
It's not that one soul is more valuable than the other, but those are two very different spiritual trajectories.
两种灵魂同样宝贵,但属灵轨迹天差地别。
1846.11-1848.69
And sure enough, it's not just that they're young.
而且问题不只在于年龄小。
1849.03-1857.07
The people who leave Catholicism also attended church at a lower rate as children and a much lower rate, uh, as teenagers.
数据显示,离开公教的人在儿童时期就不常去教堂,到青少年时期参与率更低。
1857.23-1868.58
So-This is already gonna give us one clue towards how to correct the problem of people leaving Catholicism, which is just go to church with your kids every week.
这给了我们解决流失问题的线索:每周带孩子去教堂。
1868.78-1873.90
And statistically, they're way more likely, uh, to remain Catholic.
统计上,他们留在公教会的几率将大大增加。
1874.76-1885.46
Now, the other more recent data I could find on this is, uh, from the Center for the Applied Research of the Apostolate, and they were looking just at those aged 18 to 25 who'd left the church.
我还能找到一份较新的数据,来自使徒工作应用研究中心,专门研究 18–25 岁离开教会的人。
1885.78-1891.56
So this is an imperfect dataset, because obviously you're not gonna get anybody older than 25 leaving.
这组数据并不完美,因为 25 岁以上的离开者并未被统计。
1891.98-1904.90
But nevertheless, among the people in that age range, which is most of the people who leave Catholicism, the median age at disaffiliation from Catholicism was 13 years old.
但在这一年龄段——也是离开公教的主力——脱离公教信仰的中位年龄只有 13 岁。
1905.60-1909.02
So, this is gonna be an important part of the equation.
这将是问题的一大关键。
1909.02-1913.34
'Cause if you say, Hey, why don't you focus more on those leaving the Catholic Church?
如果你问:「为什么不多关注离开公教的人?」
1913.34-1917.94
Well, for starters, there aren't a lot of 13-year-olds who watch Shameless Popery.
首先,几乎没有 13 岁的孩子会看 Shameless Popery。
1918.28-1921.98
And if there are, they're not leaving the Catholic Church probably.
就算有,他们大概也不会离开公教会。
1921.98-1923.80
These are not the ones you have to get.
他们并不是急需拯救的对象。
1923.94-1934.06
And so just understanding this as part of diagnosing the problem of why people leave is just recognizing, yeah, overwhelmingly people leave because they don't know enough about Catholicism.
因此,在诊断流失原因时必须认识到:绝大多数人离开,是因为他们对公教知之甚少。
1934.06-1943.16
They don't find the church services interesting, they don't understand the theology, they're not connected, they don't pray, et cetera, and then they leave.
他们觉得礼仪无聊,听不懂教义,也缺乏连结、不祷告,诸如此类,然后就离开了。
1943.30-1951.08
Now, those are problems that need to be solved, but those solutions are probably not going to come from something like a YouTube channel.
这些问题确实需要解决,但解决方案大概不会仅靠一个 YouTube 频道。
1951.54-1952.46
They're gonna come in different ways.
必须用别的方式来应对。
1952.46-1954.34
We're gonna talk about that at the very end.
我们最后会谈到这一点。
1954.92-1957.52
So then you say, Well, why don't people go to church?
接着你可能会问:那人们为什么不去教堂?
1957.90-1973.28
And fortunately, in 2018, Pew asked that as well, and what they found for Catholics who don't go to Mass, these are the ones setting their kids up to not practice the faith anymore, the number one reason was they said they practiced their faith in other ways.
幸好皮尤在 2018 年也问过这个问题。他们发现,不去弥撒的公教徒——也就是让孩子失去实践信仰机会的父母——给出的首要理由是「我以其他方式实践信仰」。
1973.28-1983.02
Now, I'll mention that the Catholic Church is very explicit about the, the need to practice it by going to Mass every Sunday, and we can now see in the numbers why that matters.
我得提一下,公教会非常明确地要求每个主日都去参与弥撒,而从这些数据里我们也能看出这为什么重要。
1983.28-1991.98
Practicing the faith in other ways is a pretty strong guarantee your kid is not going to continue to even self-describe as a Catholic Christian.
如果只用其他方式来实践信仰,你的孩子极有可能连「公教基督徒」这样的自称都不会继续保留。
1992.72-1996.00
The second-biggest reason was, I don't have time.
第二大理由是:「我没有时间。」
1996.44-2005.48
So, an hour a week, too much to give for God in terms of going to Mass, this is not a theological kind of objection.
也就是说,一周拿出一小时去弥撒,对他们来说都嫌多;这并不是神学上的反对,而只是这样推托。
2005.64-2014.26
This is just a sort of shrug of the shoulder, which suggests that, again, the issue here is something more like lukewarmness than a principled objection.
这更像是无所谓地耸耸肩,说明问题在于信仰冷淡,而不是基于原则的反对。
2014.30-2023.08
And then third, I haven't found a church or house of worship that I like, that's, uh Oh, actually, sorry, the second and third are actually tied, both 19%.
第三个理由是:「我还没找到自己喜欢的教堂或礼拜场所。」啊,其实第二、第三并列,都是 19%。
2025.08-2026.88
Those are the reasons.
这就是他们的理由。
2027.46-2041.98
And so if you, you wanna sum up that, I would say, we have a problem of a lot of people who self-describe as Catholic, who might be affiliated institutionally, like the mainliners of old, who are only loosely connected.
总的来说,我们的问题在于很多自称公教徒的人,和以前的主流派一样,只是制度上挂名,却与教会联系松散。
2042.42-2049.36
They might send their kids to Catholic school, they might go to Catholic school, but they aren't serious about a relationship with Jesus.
他们也许会把孩子送进公教学校,或者自己就读公教学校,但对与耶稣建立关系并不上心。
2049.76-2052.62
They aren't serious about living the life of a Catholic.
他们并不认真过公教徒的生活。
2053.00-2059.74
And so what has to happen is partly to convince them, partly to stir up interest in that.
因此,我们既要说服他们,也要重新激发他们的兴趣。
2060.02-2070.58
Now, with that in mind, I wanted to turn to a pair of articles written to, uh, sort of speak out against the, the rise of successful Catholic apologetics.
基于这一点,我想提到两篇文章,它们都在批评公教护教学的崛起。
2070.90-2078.24
One of those is Andrew Vogt's article, you may have seen, uh, March 2025 for The Gospel Coalition called, Roman Catholic Apologetics is Surging Online.
其中一篇是 Andrew Vogt 于 2025 年 3 月在《The Gospel Coalition》发表的〈Roman Catholic Apologetics is Surging Online〉。
2078.50-2079.34
Intended audience?
目标读者是谁?
2079.64-2080.80
Protestants.
新教徒。
2080.94-2089.06
And then the other is from April of this year, uh, by Aaron Wrenn at The American Reformer, and I like how conspiratorial the title is.
另一篇是今年四月 Aaron Wrenn 在《The American Reformer》发表的文章,我很喜欢它那种阴谋论味十足的标题。
2089.06-2092.50
He says, Rome's Strategic Play for Protestant Elites.
标题是《罗马对新教精英的战略布局》。
2092.70-2105.14
And anytime someone says Rome to describe everything from, like, the Vatican to, like, an ordinary Catholic expressing their views online, it's a certain lack of a grasp of the nuances we'll say.
每当有人用「罗马」来涵盖从梵蒂冈到普通网民的所有公教表达时,就说明他并没掌握其中的细微差别。
2105.48-2113.90
But I like how Wrenn puts it, because there's some areas I actually agree with him on, and some areas where I just think we're in different worlds.
不过我喜欢 Wrenn 的说法,因为有些地方我赞同,他也有些观点让我觉得我们像活在平行世界。
2113.92-2119.04
So he says, first, It's worth noting that Catholic conversions are primarily an elite phenomenon.
他说,首先值得注意的是,皈依公教主要是精英现象。
2119.26-2124.14
For those without college degrees, it's more likely that people leave Catholicism to become evangelical.
没受过大学教育的人更可能从公教流向福音派。
2124.14-2126.38
So right, that's actually part of the problem.
没错,这确实是问题的一部分。
2126.44-2132.52
People becoming Protestant, a lot of it is not just the uneducated, it's literally teenagers.
很多转向新教的人不仅教育程度低,本身就还只是青少年。
2132.52-2138.94
It's people who have very little exposure to any of the ins and outs of the theological things we're actually talking about.
他们几乎没接触过我们讨论的这些神学细节。
2139.36-2145.78
So another way to put this is, the less someone understands what's going on, the more likely they are to become an Evangelical.
换句话说,一个人越不了解情况,就越可能去当福音派。
2145.94-2150.06
The more they understand what's going on, the more likely they are to become Catholic.
相反,越了解真相,越可能走向公教。
2150.18-2153.00
Now you can put that in elitist language if you want.
你可以把这说成精英论调,
2153.02-2154.78
I just put that in information language.
我只是从资讯层面来描述。
2155.26-2174.00
Like, the better educated a person is on these questions, the more likely they are to become Catholic, which is why I think it matters to say poorly educated and non-pious Catholics are more likely to become Protestant, whereas pious, educated Protestants are often drawn towards the Catholic Church.
也就是说,在这些议题上受教育越深入的人,越容易皈依公教;这就是为何我强调,教育程度低、虔诚度不高的公教徒更容易去新教,而虔诚又受过良好教育的新教徒常被公教吸引。
2174.42-2177.70
This is certainly backed up by a wealth of anecdotal evidence.
大量轶事证据也佐证了这一点。
2178.04-2182.58
I mean, it's not hard to look at high-profile Protestant converts to Catholicism.
看看那些备受关注、从新教转入公教的名人就知道了。
2182.80-2186.34
I know Cameron Bertuzzi's name often comes up in this discussion.
例如 Cameron Bertuzzi 的名字经常被提起。
2186.42-2187.94
But where is the flip side?
那反过来呢?
2188.30-2196.54
Where is, like, a well-known, deep-in-his-faith Catholic who became Protestant in, in his adult life?
有没有广为人知、信仰深厚、成年后却转去新教的公教徒?
2196.60-2199.30
I would struggle to name one.
恐怕很难举出例子。
2199.50-2200.64
Now, is that anecdotal?
这算不算只是轶事?
2201.76-2207.88
But it's anecdotal backed up by all the statistical evidence we've seen, and I think it's quite telling.
可这些轶事与统计数据相互印证,这很能说明问题。
2208.14-2212.34
It's telling because it means the problem isn't that we don't have the truth on our side.
它说明问题并不在于我们缺乏真理。
2212.76-2213.24
We do.
真理在我们这边。
2213.48-2224.64
And the more people take the time and the trouble to dig through the research and to look at the different claims and to actually listen to both sides, the more we find them converting to Catholicism .
而且越是有人愿意花时间深入研究、听取双方论点,就越会看到他们最终选择公教。
2224.66-2236.20
the problem isn't that we don't have the truth on our side, the problem is getting people interested in the truth in the first place, which is why you have lukewarm and disaffected Catholics who, who leave.
问题不是我们没有真理,而是人们一开始就对真理缺乏兴趣,这才导致那些冷淡、失望的公教徒离开。
2236.53-2237.91
We see it in the data.
数据也印证了这一点。
2238.61-2247.48
But I wanted to turn back to Wren 'cause he says, I notice that it's not uncommon to see social media interactions in which Evangelicals are outclassed by Catholic or Orthodox counterparts.
回到 Wrenn 的观点,他说:我注意到社交媒体上常见福音派被公教或东正教对手压制的情况。
2247.70-2255.26
I wouldn't be surprised if the Catholics were being strategic in their interactions, avoiding more sophisticated Protestant thinkers who might have better answers.
他猜想,公教徒可能刻意避开更老练的新教思想家,只挑简单对象交锋。
2255.59-2257.84
If they are, this would be smart.
如果真这样做,倒也算聪明。
2257.93-2260.68
And I'll just say, as a Catholic, no.
但作为公教徒,我要说:并不是这样。
2261.48-2263.11
That's not what's happening here.
事情根本不是这么回事。
2263.68-2269.20
Like, Catholic Answers, I'll, I'll speak to the existence of Catholic Answers as an organization.
拿 Catholic Answers 这个机构来说吧。
2269.55-2287.09
Catholic Answers was created when Karl Keating came out of church one day and found that, uh, fundamentalists had papered all of the windshields in the parking lot with anti-Catholic tracts, and he thought, This is misleading and someone who doesn't know their faith well might be duped into error.
当年 Karl Keating 有一次走出教堂,发现停车场里所有挡风玻璃都被基要派放了反公教的小册子,他想:这会误导那些对信仰不熟的人,必须有人出来回应。
2287.11-2288.11
I need to answer this.
「我得给个回应。」
2288.11-2290.66
And Catholic Answers was born from this.
Catholic Answers 就此诞生。
2290.82-2291.91
It's right there in the title.
名字就叫「Catholic Answers」。
2292.16-2307.32
The point was primarily to respond to the objections Catholics were getting, and it happens that the loudest and most popular Protestant objections are often the worst, and well-formed Protestants even hear these arg- arguments and think, Oh, this is ridiculous.
它的宗旨就是回应公教常被提的反对意见。恰好最吵、最热门的新教质疑往往也是最糟糕的,连受过良好训练的新教徒听到这些论点都会觉得荒唐。
2307.34-2307.99
That's stupid.
「这太蠢了。」
2308.38-2313.88
There's no Catholic conspiracy to make those the most popular arguments, right?
公教并没有什么阴谋去把这些变成最流行的论点,对吧?
2314.28-2325.05
Y- y- you know, I, I hear this all the time, where I'll respond to a popular Protestant argument and it'll be dumb, and some smart Protestant in the comments will, will be like, Oh, that's a straw man.
我经常遇到这种情况:我回应一个流行的新教论点——它确实很糟——接着就有聪明的新教徒留言说:「哦,这是稻草人。」
2325.09-2326.26
No, no.
不,不是的。
2326.55-2328.07
Look at the view count.
看看观看次数吧。
2328.09-2330.68
I'm not choosing some weird fringe view.
我可不是挑了什么边缘怪论。
2331.22-2345.82
I'm responding to the very popular views and then the people they're wanting me to respond to are often these, like, very academic Protestants who have 500 views on their channel, and you're going, Well, that, those are not the, the immediate urgent needs that need to be responded to.
我回应的就是那些非常流行的观点。而有人希望我去回应的那些学术派新教徒,频道可能只有 500 次观看,这显然不是最紧急需要解答的对象。
2345.89-2361.53
So, it's true, not all Protestants believe every dumb, bad argument, but if you're responding to people who do believe the dumb, bad argument and you can show them, No, here's the Catholic answer to that, and this is true and good and beautiful, why would you not do that?
没错,并非所有新教徒都相信那些糟糕的论点,但如果有人确实相信,而你能向他展现公教的答案是真、善、美,为什么不去做?
2362.20-2366.66
Like, it would be bizarre to say, Well, I can't answer the popular falsehood because it's false.
如果说:「这谬论太假了,所以我不能回答。」那才奇怪。
2366.88-2368.68
That's why you answer it.
正因为是谬论,才要回答。
2368.80-2377.05
So, the fact that other Protestants may have more nuanced falsehoods that are, are more plausible or less egregiously wrong, that's fine.
当然,别的新教徒也可能提出更微妙、看起来更靠谱、错误没那么离谱的观点,
2377.39-2378.84
That's also worth addressing.
那些也值得回应。
2379.22-2386.28
But let's focus on the, the biggest, kind of, most obvious, glaring errors that can be corrected quickly.
但首先还是要针对最大、最显眼、最容易纠正的错误。
2386.57-2389.11
So, speaking personally, that's, that's what I do.
就我个人而言,这正是我所做的事。
2389.11-2391.39
I don't think there's any Catholic conspiracy.
我不认为有什么公教的阴谋。
2391.47-2394.20
I think it's, this is the kind of stuff that, that's easier to do.
我觉得,这种做法比较容易。
2394.22-2421.01
The other thing, and I say this as a genuine nod of, of appreciation and approval to even anti-Catholic Protestants, is Protestants, even those who, who may hate the Catholic Church, I know not all Protestants hate the Catholic Church, but among Protestants who are devout, you're not lukewarm and so we can have the conversation about what scripture says and I don't have to first have, like, an hour-long conversation about why you should care what scripture says.
另外,我要向甚至反公教的新教徒表达真诚的敬意:在敬虔的新教徒当中,即便有人讨厌公教会——我知道并不是所有新教徒都讨厌公教会——但你们并不冷淡;因此我们可以直接讨论圣经说了什么,而不用先花一个小时解释为什么你应该关心圣经的话。
2421.45-2426.55
I can tell you, Here's what Jesus teaches, and show you that in the Bible and you'll say, Okay, I believe in Jesus.
我可以告诉你:这是耶稣的教导,并在圣经里指出出处,你就会说「好,我信耶稣」。
2426.55-2427.36
I believe in the Bible.
我相信圣经。
2427.36-2429.11
And we can move from there.
然后我们就可以由此展开讨论。
2429.38-2440.20
The lukewarm, I can say, Hey, look, you're, you know, you're living this life of sin that is completely and explicitly forbidden in scripture, and you kinda get met with the shrug of a shoulder.
但面对冷淡的人,我说:「喂,你在过一种圣经明明禁止的罪恶生活」,对方只是耸耸肩。
2440.47-2450.74
And the shrug of the shoulder, speaking very frankly, is the strongest argument against Christianity because what can you possibly say to someone who does not care about the truth?
坦白说,这个耸肩的动作就是对基督信仰最有力的反驳,因为如果一个人根本不在乎真理,你还能说什么?
2450.95-2457.74
So, on that dark note, let's turn to how do we have, how do we cultivate a Catholic revival?
说到这里,我们来谈谈怎样孕育一场公教复兴。
2457.74-2460.78
Now, obviously this is the work of the Holy Spirit.
显然,这首先是圣灵的工作。
2461.24-2472.05
We can't do it for Him, but what we can do is clear some of the objections, and we can do the things we can be doing on our ends so that He can do what He's going to do.
我们不能替圣灵行事,但可以扫除一些障碍,尽自己能做的事,好让他成就他要做的工。
2472.16-2480.97
So, in that Pew Research study, I just now realized it said 2005, apparently, uh, in all of the slides.
在那份皮尤研究报告里,我刚注意到幻灯片上居然写着 2005 年。
2481.01-2483.01
It should have said 2025.
其实应该写 2025 年。
2483.89-2484.84
There you go.
就这样。
2485.36-2498.01
In the Pew Research study, it says, Among all respondents who were raised in a religion, whether it's Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim or some other religion, those who were raised in highly religious homes are much more likely to have retained their childhood religious identity.
皮尤研究指出:在所有自小接受宗教信仰的人——无论是新教、公教、犹太教、伊斯兰教或其他宗教——当中,那些在高度虔诚家庭里长大的人,更有可能保留童年时的宗教身份。
2498.01-2500.41
Like, that's just a basic sociological point.
这只是最基本的社会学常识。
2500.78-2507.16
If you instill that religion matters to your kids, they're much more likely to think their religion matters when they're adults.
如果你向孩子灌输宗教很重要,他们长大后也更可能认为宗教重要。
2507.16-2512.78
If you instill that it doesn't, by your actions, not just by your words, they're much more likely to think that it doesn't.
如果你的行为(不只是口头)让孩子觉得宗教不重要,他们将来也更可能这么想。
2513.26-2534.88
Indeed, 74% of people who were raised in a religion and grew up attending weekly religious services in a family in which religion was very important still identify with their childhood religion today, compared to 15% who grew up in this environment who now say they have no religion, and 10% who've switched to a different religion.
事实上,在那些自小每周参加礼拜、家庭非常看重宗教的人里,今天仍认同童年宗教身份的占 74%;相比之下,同样背景下如今自称无宗教者只有 15%,改信其他宗教的为 10%。
2534.89-2553.93
So, if you do two things, number one, uh, you go to mass every week and, uh, number two, you really instill that this is important to your kids, you've got about a three out of four chance that they're going to continue practicing their faith in adulthood.
所以,只要做到两件事:第一,每周去参加弥撒;第二,让孩子真切感受到这很重要——那么他们成年后继续实践信仰的概率大约是四分之三。
2554.22-2568.76
By contrast, those who gr- were raised in a religion, but grew up seldom or never attending religious services or in a family in which religion was not too important or not at all important, fewer than half still identify with their fam- their childhood religion.
相反,那些虽然有宗教背景,却很少或从不参加礼拜,或者家庭觉得宗教并不重要的人,成年后仍认同童年宗教的不到一半。
2569.07-2573.49
40% are now nothing, 16% are now a different religion.
其中 40% 现在无宗教信仰,16% 改信了其他宗教。
2574.11-2583.84
Now, there's cause for alarm there because only 26% of parents are taking their kids to church, uh, every week.
这值得警惕,因为只有 26% 的父母每周带孩子去教堂。
2584.34-2586.24
That's pretty bad.
这相当糟糕。
2586.61-2593.39
And of that group, 54% grew up going to church .
而在这 26% 里,有 54% 小时候自己每周去教堂。
2593.43-2596.31
weekly, another 11%, at least once or twice a month.
另外 11% 至少每月去一到两次。
2596.31-2605.27
So most parents today grew up going to church, most parents today don't go to church except v- very rarely.
也就是说,大多数父母小时候常去教堂,但现在除了极偶尔外几乎不去了。
2605.49-2607.31
That's a problem for the next generation.
这对下一代来说是个大问题。
2607.37-2615.57
We can stop that problem by getting parents who care even a little bit about Christianity to go back to Mass, to go back to church.
只要让哪怕稍微在意基督信仰的父母回到弥撒、回到教堂,就能遏制这个问题。
2615.61-2621.21
If you won't do it for your own sake, do it for the sake of your children because we can see in the numbers that it makes a huge difference.
如果你不为自己去,也请为孩子去,因为数据清楚显示这差别巨大。
2621.43-2628.33
Second, turning back to this book, we can see the importance of things like prayer and Bible reading.
其次,回到这本书,我们可以看到祷告和读经的重要性。
2628.37-2634.19
Now this is one area where, uh, even traditional Catholics weren't great.
这一点上,即便是传统公教徒也做得不到位。
2634.29-2647.35
Like, there's clearly a lot of room, and I think this is something where Catholics could learn a lot from ordinary Protestants about just inculcating a spirit of prayer and reading of scripture with your kids.
这方面显然有很大提升空间;公教徒完全可以向普通新教徒学习,教孩子建立祷告和读经的习惯。
2647.71-2663.11
So to do things like just sit in the living room chair and read scripture in the morning, have a little time for personal meditation, invite your kids to come sit on your lap if they're of an age where that's normal, and read scripture with them, let them at least see you reading scripture.
比如早晨坐在客厅的椅子上读圣经,留点个人默想的时间;如果孩子年纪还小,可以让他们坐在你腿上,一起读经,让他们至少看到你在读经。
2663.21-2670.53
Let this be something that they normalize and think is part of what it is to be an adult Christian, and then encourage them to do the same.
让他们把这视为理所当然,认为做一个成年基督徒就该如此,然后鼓励他们也照做。
2670.99-2674.03
And there's all sorts of other ways you can do this as well.
除此之外,还有很多其他做法。
2674.07-2677.33
Um, there's a great amount of religious programming, things like Formed.
比如说,有大量宗教节目,像 Formed 这样的资源。
2677.49-2680.63
If you're not familiar with Formed, it's, uh, you can get the app.
如果你对 Formed 不熟悉,你可以下载它的 App。
2680.75-2681.85
They have a bunch of programming.
里面有很多节目。
2681.85-2682.95
They've got a lot of stuff online.
他们在网上也有大量内容。
2682.95-2685.03
You can watch religious shows.
你可以观看宗教节目。
2685.31-2687.89
There's a lot of good Protestant content for kids as well.
也有很多适合孩子的新教优质内容。
2688.25-2702.35
There's, uh, I mean, we do, like, a whole series of Bible stories with our kids that they listen to, or they used to listen to at night before they'd go to sleep, and they learned scripture that way just by hearing these stories and then a song at five and three.
我们家还给孩子准备了一整个圣经故事系列,他们以前睡前都会听。通过听这些故事,再配上一首歌曲——当时他们才五岁和三岁——就这样学习了圣经。
2702.81-2705.19
You ask them now, like, What happens after the Exodus?
现在你问他们:「出埃及记之后发生了什么?」
2705.19-2706.17
They'll tell you Joshua.
他们会回答「约书亚记」。
2706.59-2708.41
It's like, Hey, that's great.
你会想:嘿,这太棒了。
2708.43-2709.39
They know the stories.
他们知道这些故事。
2709.59-2710.27
They're familiar.
他们很熟悉。
2710.45-2712.55
The Bible isn't daunting and unfamiliar.
圣经对他们来说并不陌生、也不可怕。
2712.87-2715.13
That's a good first start.
这是很好的第一步。
2715.23-2717.79
That's no guarantee they're gonna stay religious their whole life.
当然,这并不能保证他们一生都保持信仰。
2717.79-2722.05
It's no promise that your kids will stay religious their whole life, but these are concrete things we can do.
也不能保证你的孩子一辈子都信主,但这是我们可以实际做到的事情。
2722.53-2734.73
If the problem is in many ways won or lost before they turn 13 in the numbers, then this means a lot of the solution is working on the family.
如果数据显示问题往往在孩子 13 岁之前就决定胜负,那解决方案很大程度上就要着眼于家庭。
2735.83-2742.17
Strikingly, the story of whether they should go to Catholic school is a little more complicated.
有趣的是,是否该上公教学校这个问题就要复杂得多。
2742.35-2748.13
Uh, Smith and his colleagues found that it was unclear whether Catholic schooling actually made a difference.
Smith 及其同事发现,是否就读公教学校是否真的起作用,其实并不明确。
2748.13-2753.27
On the one hand, kids who went to Catholic school were much more religious later on.
一方面,上过公教学校的孩子后来通常更虔诚。
2753.29-2765.63
On the other hand, that seems to have been attributable to the fact that the kind of parents who send their kids to Catholic school are the kinds that are already doing all the right things or instilling the importance of faith in their kids.
但另一方面,这似乎是因为能把孩子送进公教学校的父母,本身就已经在做对的事情,并且把信仰的重要性灌输给孩子。
2766.19-2771.73
But in a powerful way, one thing that's an important component of this is the role of fathers.
然而,更关键的一环是父亲的角色。
2771.73-2790.41
So Smith and his colleagues said, Our interview data So this is, by the way, they did, like, broad level, uh, data, and then they also did interviews with some, like, portion of the 18 to 23-year-old Catholics that they were looking at, both those who continued to practice the faith and those who'd stopped.
Smith 和同事指出:我们的访谈资料——他们先做大规模的数据调查,然后又访问了一部分 18–23 岁的公教徒,包括继续实践信仰的,也包括已经停止的——
2790.83-2801.93
And they found, in their interview data, is that the religious faiths and practices of fathers play a particularly important role in determining the religious trajectories of both their sons and their daughters.
结果发现,父亲的信仰与实践在决定儿女的宗教走向上起着特别重要的作用。
2802.35-2806.51
And they said there are exceptions to this rule, but they are exceptions to a clear rule.
他们说,这条规律也有例外,但那毕竟是例外。
2806.59-2818.93
Not a single estranged emerging adult, for example, in their research data, like in the interview data, not of anyone, not a single estranged emerging adult had a father who was an engaged Catholic.
例如,在他们的访谈资料里,没有任何一个与教会疏离的年轻成人的父亲是积极参与公教信仰的。
2819.57-2827.07
So one of the things that you see very clearly in the data is if one parent is in and the other one isn't, that's a problem.
数据清楚显示,如果父母一方投入信仰而另一方不投入,就会出现问题。
2827.07-2832.63
And this is particularly the case if mom is trying to get everyone to go to church and dad doesn't care.
尤其是当妈妈努力带全家去教堂,而爸爸毫不在乎时,问题就更严重。
2832.93-2837.47
So fathers especially, take this very seriously.
所以父亲们尤其要认真看待这件事。
2838.53-2867.27
The last thing I'd point out in terms of just the research data from the book is that they looked at four different kind of trajectories for, for what made, uh, for a successful kind of religiously practicing Catholic later on, and it looked at things like if, basically if parents took the faith very seriously and then they had a social group that took the faith seriously, some kind of peer network, people they could turn to with questions of faith, spiritual support system, et cetera.
根据书中的研究数据,作者还分析了四条不同的成长轨迹,看哪些因素能让人后来成为坚持实践信仰的公教徒:基本上,如果父母对信仰非常认真,再加上有同样认真对待信仰的社交圈、同辈网络、可咨询信仰问题的伙伴和属灵支持系统等等。
2867.67-2879.41
And, you know, ideally if they went to Catholic school, but it worked pretty well even if they didn't, then they were pretty well likely, more likely than not, to still be practicing the faith five years later.
理想情况下再读公教学校就更好,但即使没读,只要具备上述条件,五年后仍在实践信仰的可能性也很高。
2879.45-2886.33
So they look at these different trajectories, and so we can say these are some of the recipes for success.
因此,透过这些不同路径,我们可以得出若干成功的「配方」。
2886.65-2893.93
But then finally, I want to actually, uh, end with some advice that Trent gave because some of you watching, of course, don't have families of your own.
最后,我想引用 Trent 的一些建议作为结束,因为在座的许多人目前还没有自己的家庭。
2893.95-2897.63
This advice isn't relevant for you yet, maybe won't ever be relevant for you.
这些建议现在对你可能不适用,也许永远用不上。
2897.63-2904.65
Or you've got kids who, they're already out of the house, they've already made their decisions, and, and you're dealing with the outcome of that.
或者,你的孩子已经离家,做出了自己的选择,你正在面对其结果。
2905.49-2916.63
But as Trent points out, given the sheer number of people who are lukewarm or ex-Catholics, once you diagnose the problem that way, it becomes pretty different kind of how you approach it.
不过正如 Trent 所说,鉴于冷淡或前公教徒数量庞大,当你这样诊断问题时,处理方式就会大不相同。
2916.63-2923.03
That, in other words, what's needed is often not the elite solution, uh, to use Wren's language.
换句话说,用 Wren 的话来说,我们常常不需要那种精英式的解决方案。
2923.03-2929.01
We, we don't need to always have the super in-depth, hour-long theological answer to everything.
我们没必要总是给出超级深入、长达一小时的神学答案。
2929.89-2932.01
Sometimes it's enough to just invite people to church.
有时候,只要邀请别人去教堂就足够了。
2932.01-2944.39
Whatever the solution is, treating our Catholic faith as a matter of spiritual life and death in everything we do, from preaching, to teaching, to laypeople's interactions with everyone they meet, needs to be a part of our response to this crisis.
无论采取什么方案,在宣讲、教学以及平信徒与人相处的每个环节,都要把我们的公教信仰视为关乎灵魂生死的大事,这应当成为我们回应这场危机的一部分。
2944.79-2955.55
And it has to be done in real life, not just online, since online converts and reverts need an orthodox inviting place in the real world if they wanna come home to the faith.
而且这一切必须在现实生活中进行,而不仅仅是线上;因为网络上的新教友或重返者若想回到信仰,需要在现实世界里找到正统又友善的归宿。
2956.01-2960.97
Keep in mind that one in every eight people you meet is a former Catholic.
请记住,你遇到的每八个人中,就有一位曾是公教徒。
2961.33-2963.21
One in eight.
八分之一。
2963.25-2966.49
So a simple invitation to attend Mass can go a long way.
所以一句简单的「要不要一起来参加弥撒?」可能就起到大作用。
2966.95-2970.39
25 years ago, a girl at my high school invited me to Mass.
25 年前,我高中里有位女生邀请我去参加弥撒。
2970.77-2975.49
It changed my life, and consequently it changed the lives of countless other people.
那次经历改变了我的人生,也间接改变了无数其他人的人生。
2975.49-2977.23
So I'd just close with that.
我想就用这一点作为结束。
2977.31-2986.41
You know, frequently when you ask people who do become Catholic why they became Catholic, they'll point to the experience of somebody in their life.
你知道,当你询问那些后来成为公教徒的人为何皈依时,他们往往会提到生命中某个人带给他们的经历。
2986.53-3011.87
And if you run in a really intellectual circle, it may be that you know a lot of intellectual converts to Catholicism, but there are both many, and there's a need for many more, people who have different journeys, who just need someone to be there for them spiritually, who need someone to just invite them to church the way that young woman invited Trent to church, who just need someone to accompany them on a spiritual search maybe you're not even aware they're going on.
如果你所处的是一个高度知识分子的圈子,你可能认识许多因为理性思考而皈依公教的人;但还有许多人、而且需要更多人,走着不同的旅程——他们只是需要有人在属灵上陪伴,像当年那位女生邀请 Trent 去教堂一样,简单地邀请他们去教会;需要有人在他们或许尚未对外透露的信仰探索中陪他们同行。
3012.01-3030.99
So whether you consider yourself a well-equipped Catholic apologist or not, I would impart that, that take care of your family, help instill the faith in them, and take care of those God's put in your life by inviting them to share in the riches and wonder of Jesus Christ and his Catholic Church.
所以,无论你自认是不是装备完善的公教护教学者,我都想劝勉你:先顾好自己的家庭,把信仰扎根在他们心里;也要善待神放在你生命里的每一个人,邀请他们分享耶稣基督和他的公教会的丰富与奇妙。
3031.03-3033.09
For Shameless Popery, I'm Joe Heschmeyer.
这里是《无耻教皇党》,我是 Joe Heschmeyer。
3033.15-3033.77
God bless you.
愿神祝福你们。