欢迎回到 Jim 的杂谈。 Welcome back to Jim's Potpourri.
我是 Joe Heschmeyer，我想探讨一个问题：美国 的公教复兴是否正在进行中，或者美国的公教会是否正在衰落。 I'm Joe Heschmeyer, and I want to explore the question of whether an American Catholic revival is underway or whether the American Catholic Church is dying.
因为如果你在 Google 上搜索类似「公教会 大批」这样的词 ，至少根据我的经验，排在前两位的搜索结果是一个视频，解释为什么 公教徒正大批离开教会，以及为什么年轻男性正大批加入公教会。 Because if you do something like Google "Catholic Church droves," at least in my experience, the top two results are a video explaining why Catholics are leaving the Church in droves and why young men are joining the Catholic Church in droves.
你可能会问：「那么，哪一个是对的呢？」答案在某种程度上是两者都对。 And you might be saying, "Well, which of those is right?" And the answer in part is both of them.
所以，这不仅仅是你用 Google 搜索时弹出的前两个视频。 So it's not just, you know, the first two videos you pull up when you Google this.
你会找到各种看似矛盾的资料。 You'll find all sorts of seemingly contradictory sources about this.
所以最近，《纽约邮报》刊登了一篇文章，讲述了年 轻人大批皈依公教的情况，并分享了一些个人故事。 So recently, the New York Post had a piece on young people converting en masse to Catholicism and told some of the personal stories.
但你也会看到像 Eric Salmon 的文章，其中提到每有 100 位新公教徒，就有 800 人离开美国的公教会，而且 这些数字实际上比听起来还要糟糕，这很符合《危机》杂志的风格。 But then you also have articles like Eric Salmon's article about how for every 100 new Catholics, 800 people are leaving the Catholic Church in America and that the numbers are actually even worse somehow than that sounds, fittingly for Crisis magazine.
甚至我的朋友兼同事 Trent Horn 最近也制作了一个视频， 讲述了他认为为什么新教正在获胜，以及这对公教徒提供了什么教训。 And even my friend and colleague Trent Horn did a video recently on why he says Protestantism is winning and the lesson this provides for Catholics.
现在，我想在这个问题上部分同意每个人的观点，也部分不同意每个人的 观点，因为造成这种困惑的不仅仅是标题，也包括当你深入研究数据时。 Now, I want to agree with everybody in part and disagree with everybody in part on this, because it's not just the kind of headlines that can cause this confusion, it's also when you get into the data.
所以 Trent 和 Eric 以及那些关注一些令人担忧 迹象的人，主要是在看皮尤研究中心今年二月发布的一项研究。 So Trent and Eric and people who are focusing on, uh, some of the alarming signs are largely looking at a Pew Research study that came out in February of this year.
尽管这项研究的标题是《美国基督教衰落放缓，可能已趋于稳定》，但文 章中关于美国公教会现状的一些消息却相当难看，特别是提到每有 10 0 人加入，就有大约 840 人离开了公教，转向了其他信仰。 And although it's called Decline of Christianity in the US has Slowed, May Have Leveled Off, nevertheless the article has some pretty ugly news for the state of the Catholic Church in America, namely that bit about how for every 100 people who join, some 840 people have left Catholicism for something else.
接受这些离开者最多的实际上并不是新教。 The largest recipient of this isn't actually Protestantism.
大多数是变成了没有宗教信仰的人。 Mostly this is people becoming religiously unaffiliated.
事实上，新教也在挣扎，只是当你看到那些数字时，挣扎程度远不如美国的公教。 In fact, Protestantism is struggling as well, just not nearly as much as American Catholicism when you look at, when you look at those numbers.
然而，其他一些数字却讲述了一个稍微不同的故事。 Other numbers, though, tell a somewhat different story.
现在，这有点棘手，因为它没有系统地组织起来，但我知道《支柱》杂志，特别是 Luke Coffman，在逐个教区收集成人洗礼人数的证据方面做得很好。 Now, this is tricky because it's not, uh, systematically organized, but I know that the Pillar has done, Luke Coffman in particular has done good work of just gathering evidence on a diocese by diocese level about the number of adult baptisms.
我们看到在很多情况下，成人洗礼人数大幅增加。 And what we're seeing in many cases is that adult baptisms are way up.
我稍后会更详细地介绍这些数据。 I'll get more into that data in a little bit.
但我只是想提出一个问题：我们如何看待这一切？ But I just want to kind of pose the question, what do we make of all this?
我们正在看到一场复兴吗？ Are we seeing a revival?
我们正在看到公教在美国的消亡吗？ Are we seeing the death of Catholicism in America?
或者情况更复杂一些？ Or is it something a little more complicated?
正如你可能猜到的，我会说情况更复杂一些，尽管我确实认为有真实、良好、合 理的理由抱有希望，认为一场真正的复兴正在悄然发生，并且处于早期阶段。 And as you might guess, I'm going to say a little more complicated, although I do think there are authentic, good, reasonable grounds for hope that a, a real revival is happening quietly and in its early stages.
现在下定论还为时过早，但我们正看到一种潜在的转变。 Sort of too soon to say for sure, but we're seeing a shift underfoot.
但要理解这一点，我们必须知道如何分析数据，这有几个原因使得情况很棘手。 But to get there, we have to know how to parse through the data, and this is tricky for a few reasons.
首先，虽然新教被分为福音派和主流派基督徒，但当你查看皮尤研究中心等机构的数 据时，通常实际上是主流派新教徒、福音派新教徒和历史上的黑人新教徒，因为这些 群体，尽管都属于广义的新教范畴，但在社会学上差异很大，运作方式也不同。 The first is that while Protestantism is divided into evangelical and mainline Christians, when you look at, like, Pew Research data and other research data, usually it's actually, uh, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, and historically Black Protestants, because these groups, even though they're all under the broad umbrella of Protestant, are pretty different sociologically and they operate in different ways.
这将非常重要，因为公教没有这些官方的区分。 That's going to be really important 'cause Catholicism doesn't have those official distinctions.
你不会去一个公教会，然后看到它写着：「我们是主流派公教会」，或者 「我们是福音派公教会」。但尽管如此，我们也可以有一些类似的情况。 You don't, you know, go to a Catholic Church and it says, "We're a mainline Catholic Church," or, "We're an evangelical Catholic Church." But nevertheless, we can have a little bit of something similar.
在一些重要方面也会有所不同。 It's going to be different in some important ways as well.
欢迎回到 Jim 的杂谈。 But to get a sense, here's Redeemed Zoomer who is himself a more conservative or evangelical Presbyterian who attends a mainline Presbyterian Church explaining, um, kind of from his perspective what those differences look like.
我是 Joe Heschmeyer，我想探讨一个问题：美国 的公教复兴是否正在进行中，或者美国的公教会是否正在衰落。 And obviously this is not going to be super favorable to someone from more of a liberal perspective.
因为如果你在 Google 上搜索类似「公教会 大批」这样的词 ，至少根据我的经验，排在前两位的搜索结果是一个视频，解释为什么 公教徒正大批离开教会，以及为什么年轻男性正大批加入公教会。 Additionally, he is a Zoomer, so of course he's doing this while playing Minecraft.
你可能会问：「那么，哪一个是对的呢？」答案在某种程度上是两者都对。 So if you hear a weird clicking sound, that's what's going on.
所以，这不仅仅是你用 Google 搜索时弹出的前两个视频。 So for those of you who don't know, um, I'm a Presbyterian and there are a bunch of Presbyterian denominations in America, but there's two main ones.
你会找到各种看似矛盾的资料。 There's the PCUSA, Presbyterian Church USA, which is the more, it's the more liberal one, and the PCA, the Presbyterian Church in America, which is the more conservative one, and I'm more conservative.
所以最近，《纽约邮报》刊登了一篇文章，讲述了年 轻人大批皈依公教的情况，并分享了一些个人故事。 So it makes sense that I would be in the PCA, right?
但你也会看到像 Eric Salmon 的文章，其中提到每有 100 位新公教徒，就有 800 人离开美国的公教会，而且 这些数字实际上比听起来还要糟糕，这很符合《危机》杂志的风格。 No.
甚至我的朋友兼同事 Trent Horn 最近也制作了一个视频， 讲述了他认为为什么新教正在获胜，以及这对公教徒提供了什么教训。 There's a reason why I'm not, why I'm in the PCUSA instead of the PCA.
现在，我想在这个问题上部分同意每个人的观点，也部分不同意每个人的 观点，因为造成这种困惑的不仅仅是标题，也包括当你深入研究数据时。 So really it's because the PCUSA is the original one.
所以 Trent 和 Eric 以及那些关注一些令人担忧 迹象的人，主要是在看皮尤研究中心今年二月发布的一项研究。 It's what's called a mainline Protestant denomination because it's the, like, it, there used to just be the Presbyterian Churches.
尽管这项研究的标题是《美国基督教衰落放缓，可能已趋于稳定》，但文 章中关于美国公教会现状的一些消息却相当难看，特别是提到每有 10 0 人加入，就有大约 840 人离开了公教，转向了其他信仰。 There wasn't, like, mainline and evangelical denominations.
接受这些离开者最多的实际上并不是新教。 That distinction came about when the mainline Protestant Churches in all brands, Presbyterian, Methodist, Lutheran, Baptist, Episcopal, they all started to become more theologically liberal.
大多数是变成了没有宗教信仰的人。 Um, and that's not quite the same as politically liberal, as I always say.
事实上，新教也在挣扎，只是当你看到那些数字时，挣扎程度远不如美国的公教。 Theologically liberal means they don't take the claims of Christianity as seriously and they don't really care if people actually believe in it.
然而，其他一些数字却讲述了一个稍微不同的故事。 Um, it becomes more of just, like, going through the motions and the only thing they really care about is social justice, um, that they sort of redefine the gospel as that.
现在，这有点棘手，因为它没有系统地组织起来，但我知道《支柱》杂志，特别是 Luke Coffman，在逐个教区收集成人洗礼人数的证据方面做得很好。 Um, so when the mainline denominations became more theologically liberal, the evangelical denominations were basically a bunch of conservative outcasts who split off, who ran away, and who started their own things.
我们看到在很多情况下，成人洗礼人数大幅增加。 So it's no exception for Presbyterians.
我稍后会更详细地介绍这些数据。 The PCUSA, Presbyterian Church USA, is the original Presbyterian denomination, and the PCA, the Presbyterian Church in America, is a denomination that was formed by a bunch of conservatives who got frustrated with the PCUSA becoming more liberal and who split off.
但我只是想提出一个问题：我们如何看待这一切？ So one of the reasons this matters is that what we're looking at in the data isn't necessarily the death of Catholicism in America.
我们正在看到一场复兴吗？ It seems much more to be the death of mainline or liberal Christianity in America.
我们正在看到公教在美国的消亡吗？ And we see this by looking quite clearly at the trajectories of the two different groups of Protestants.So remember, the Pew Research stuff, uh, from 2025 breaks out evangelicals, historically Black Protestants, and mainliners, and in particular, it finds that while there's this overall downward trend, it has stabilized.
或者情况更复杂一些？ It hasn't affected everyone equally.
正如你可能猜到的，我会说情况更复杂一些，尽管我确实认为有真实、良好、合 理的理由抱有希望，认为一场真正的复兴正在悄然发生，并且处于早期阶段。 So evangelicals went from being 26% of the population to 23% of the population.
现在下定论还为时过早，但我们正看到一种潜在的转变。 That's a relative decline of about 11%.
但要理解这一点，我们必须知道如何分析数据，这有几个原因使得情况很棘手。 For those of you who don't understand relative decline, if you go from being 2% to 1% of the population, you've lost half of your membership.
首先，虽然新教被分为福音派和主流派基督徒，但当你查看皮尤研究中心等机构的数 据时，通常实际上是主流派新教徒、福音派新教徒和历史上的黑人新教徒，因为这些 群体，尽管都属于广义的新教范畴，但在社会学上差异很大，运作方式也不同。 You haven't lost one percent.
这将非常重要，因为公教没有这些官方的区分。 So relative decline is the better measure to use when you're seeing how much did something grow or shrink by, um, in looking at, like, the health of the organization.
你不会去一个公教会，然后看到它写着：「我们是主流派公教会」，或者 「我们是福音派公教会」。但尽管如此，我们也可以有一些类似的情况。 So evangelicals are about 11% smaller now, relative for overall population growth, et cetera, et cetera, than they were in 2007.
在一些重要方面也会有所不同。 But in that same time period, mainline Protestants have just bottomed out.
他们失去了将近 40% 的成员。 They've lost just shy of 40% of their members.
他们曾占人口的 18%，现在占人口的 11%。 They were 18% of the population, they're now 11% of the population.
正如我们将看到的，这比公教经历的衰落更严重。 That is, as we're going to see, a worse decline, uh, than Catholicism has experienced.
所以这表明这不是一个公教与新教的问题。 So that suggests this isn't a Catholic-Protestant issue.
这更接近于一个神学自由派与神学保守派的问题。 This is much closer to a theologically liberal versus theologically conservative issue.
另一种理解方式是，皮尤研究中心也会询问人们是否认为自己是自由派或保守派。 Another way you can get there is Pew also asks people about whether they consider themselves liberal or conservative.
因此，正如主流派（正在消亡）和福音派（正在挣扎但幸存）的轨迹存在明显差异一 样，同样地，保守派中出现了轻微的下降，而自由派中则出现了惊人的下降速度。 And so, just as you've got a clear difference in the trajectories of mainliners, who are dying, and evangelicals, who are struggling but surviving, well, similarly, you have a slight decline, uh, among conservatives and a shocking rate of decline among liberals.
因此，用皮尤研究的话来说，今天自称自由派的人中有 37% 认同基督教。 So in the words of the Pew study, 37% of self-described liberals today identify with Christianity.
37%。 37%.
这比 2007 年的 62% 有所下降。 That's down from 62% in 2007.
所以他们称之为下降了 25 个百分点，但就相对下降而言，这显然更大，因 为在 2007 年，如果你接触三位自由派人士，可能其中两位是基督徒。 So they call that a 25-point decline, but it's obviously bigger than that in terms of relative decline, that in 2007 if you were to approach, say, three liberals, probably two of them would be Christian.
今天，其中一位是基督徒。 Today, one of them would be Christian.
这是一个很大的下降。 That's a big decline.
此外，现在大多数自由派人士表示没有宗教信仰，占 51%，而 2007 年这一比例为 27%。 Additionally, most liberals now report having no religion, 51%, compared to, uh, 27% in 2007.
所以好吧，现在你接触的是四位而不是三位。 So okay, now you approach four rather than three.
如果你接触四位自由派人士并问：「你的宗教信 仰是什么？」过去很可能其中一位会说没有。 If you approached four liberals and said, "What's your religious affiliation?" chances are one of them in the past would have said nothing.
现在会有两位这么说。 Now two of them would say that.
所以这是一个相当惊人的情况，现在在自由派人群中，没有宗 教信仰的人（即不信教或无宗教归属的人）比基督徒更多。 So this is a pretty striking case that there are now more religious nones, so unreligious or unaffiliated people, um, than Christians among the population just of li- liberals.
这是前所未有的。 This is unprecedented.
所以你可以在数据中看到所有这些。 So you can see all of that in the data.
与此同时，早在 2007 年，89% 的保守派人士自称是基督徒。 In the meantime, 89% of conservatives back in 2007 described themselves as Christian.
今天，这一比例为 82%。 Today, 82%.
所以仍然有下降，但下降幅度要小得多。 So you still have a decline, but it is a way smaller decline.
所以如果你不从公教与新教的角度，而是从政治上或更重要的是神学上的自由派与 保守派的角度来思考这个问题，那么我认为你可以看到对这些数据更好的解释。 So if you think about this not in terms of Catholic-Protestant things, but in terms of liberal-conservative both politically or more importantly theologically, then you can see, I think, a much better explanation for the data.
所以这里的困难在于，正如我之前所说，我们没有自称的福音派公 教徒和主流派公教徒，但我们在数字中确实看到了类似的情况。 So the difficulty here is, we don't have just, as I said before, self-proclaimed evangelical Catholics and mainline Catholics, but we do see something like this in the numbers.
我稍后会解释我们如何得出这个结论。 And I'll get into how we can get there in just a second.
但首先，总体数字来看，公教徒占人口的比例从 24% 下降到 19%。 But first, overall numbers, Catholics went from 24% of the population to 19% of the population.
这是一个 21% 的下降，实际上，真实的相对下降比这更糟，因 为其中一部分是来自其他地方的移民，他们在那里已经是公教徒了。 Now, that is a 21% decline, and actually, the real relative decline is worse than that, because some of that is immigrant- like immigrants coming in from other places where they were already Catholic.
他们不是突然皈依的。 They're not suddenly converting.
所以如果你只看美国本土出生的人口，下降幅度超过 20%。 So if you look at just, like, the native-born US population, the decline is worse than 20%.
但尽管如此，这就是我们目前的情况。 But nevertheless, that's kind of where we're at.
我们介于福音派和主流派新教徒之间，这很合理，因为如果你从这个 角度来看待公教徒，你会发现有一部分公教徒在圣经观和神学保守主 义等方面更接近福音派，然后还有一部分更类似于你所说的主流派。 We fall somewhere in between where evangelicals are and where mainline Protestants are, which makes sense, because if you were to think about Catholics in those terms, you've got a group of Catholics who would be closer to evangelicals in their view of scripture and theological conservativism and everything else, and then you've got a group that are more akin to what you would call mainliners.
所以，就像你只说长老会，你会得到一个有点误导性的数字，而不是细分为 哪种类型的长老会一样，我认为公教在某种程度上也发生了同样的事情。 So i- in the same way that if you, you just said Presbyterian, you'd get a kind of misleading number rather than breaking it out into which type of Presbyterian, the same thing, I think, is happening somewhat with Catholicism.
几个月前，我专门做了一个关于自由派公教的视频，特别展示 了自称政治上自由派和神学上自由派的祭司几乎消失殆尽。 Now, a couple months ago, I did a video on liberal Catholicism specifically showing that self-identified politically liberal and theologically liberal priests have all but evaporated.
我不会重述所有这些内容。 I'm not going to rehash all of that.
如果你想看，可以去那里看。 If you want to watch that, you can go watch it there.
但我会指出一个数据点，我认为它以一种非常深刻、有点令人震惊的方 式指向了这一点，这个数据来自美国公教大学 (CUA) 公教项目 进行的「极化、代际动态和虐待危机持续影响」研究，该研究发现，神 学上进步派和非常进步派的祭司曾占新成为祭司者的 68%。 But I will point out one data point that I think points to this in a really profound, kind of shocking way, uh, coming from the Polarization, Generational Dynamics and Ongoing Impact of the Abuse Crisis study, uh, by the Catholic Project at CUA, which found that theologically progressive and very progressive priests once made up 68% of new ordinands.
所以如果你回到六十年代，问一位新成为祭司的祭 司他如何看待自己，他十有八九会说「进步派」。 So if you were, uh, go back in the '60s and ask a newly ordained priest how he considered himself, h- he was going to say "progressive" more than two-thirds of the time.
今天，这个数字已经减少到几乎为零。 Today, that number has dwindled to almost zero.
就今天新成为祭司的祭司中自认为神学上进步派的人数 而言，这个比例低于百分之一，或者说，是低个位数。 It is below one percent, or w- excuse me, low single digits in terms of the, the number who identify themselves today in terms of newly ordained priests as being theologically progressive.
所以自由派公教祭司根本未能激励下一代自由派公教祭司追随他们的脚步。 So liberal Catholic priests have simply failed to inspire a generation of liberal Catholic priests to follow in their footsteps.
这是一个巨大的数据点。 That's one enormous data point.
但另一个数据点实际上来自这本书，《年轻的美国公教徒》，作者是 Chri stian Smith 和他的合著者 Kyle Longest、Jon athan Hill 和 Carrie Christopherson。 But another one-Actually comes from this book here, Young Catholic America, uh, Christian Smith and his co-authors, Kyle Longest, uh, Jonathan Hill and Carrie Christopherson.
这本书有点老了，所以我不太愿意用它来描述 2024 年或 2025 年的趋势，因为这本书已经出版 10 年了。 This is a little bit older of a book, so I'm hesitant to use it to describe trends in 2024 or 2025, uh, because the book is 10 years old.
它出版于 2014 年，但它专门研究他们所称的「新兴成年人」。 It's from 2014, but it's looking specifically at what they called emerging adults.
所以这些公教徒当时年龄在 18 到 23 岁，现在是 28 到 33 岁，他 们提供了一些相当好的数据，专门研究公教徒，这种方式我之后很少看到有人这样做。 So these were Catholics who at the time were 18 to 23, they're now 28 to 33, and they provided some pretty good data looking just at Catholics in a way that I haven't seen a lot of people do since.
与皮尤研究的数据不同，他们以一种更有帮助的方式区分了自由派和保守派。 And unlike the Pew Research stuff, they break out liberal and conservative in, in a more helpful way.
虽然还不完美，但我认为它对于了解发展轨迹以及他们全面发现的情 况更有帮助，比如参加教会活动、祈祷，甚至像克己这样的事情。 Still not perfect, but it's, I think, more helpful for getting a sense of the trajectory and what they found across the board, things like church attendance, prayer, even things like self-denial.
那些在自由派公教家庭中长大的青少年和新兴成年人，其宗教信仰程 度和实践公教信仰的程度，远低于在更温和或传统家庭中长大的人。 Those teenagers and emergent adults who'd been raised in liberal Catholic homes were way less religious, way less practicing of anything like Catholicism than those raised in more moderate or traditional homes.
当然，如何定义这些术语有很多说法，但这至少给了我们一个关于发展轨迹的印象。 Now, there's a whole bit about how you define those terms, but this gives us at least a, an impression of a trajectory, say.
用作者的话来说，他们写道：「最惊人的发现是望弥撒的差异。」 In the words of the authors, they say, "The most striking finding is the difference in mass attendance.
在那些认为父母分别是传统派或温和派的新兴成年人中，有 27% 和 29 % 完全不望弥撒，而在青少年时期父母是自由派公教徒的人中，有整整 52 % 完全不望弥撒。」所以我们来确保你理解这一点，至少在 2014 年是 这样，而且我认为有充分的理由相信这种情况在几十年里保持得相当稳定。 While 27 and 29% of emergent adults do not attend mass at all among those who serve a responding parent as traditional or moderate respectively, fully 52% do not attend mass at all who has a teenager- who as a teenager had a liberal Catholic parent." So let's just make sure you're getting that, at least in 2014, and I think there's good reason we're gonna see this actually stayed pretty stable, uh, across the decades.
所以我认为今天的情况没有根本性的不同。 So I don't think this is radically different today.
如果你在传统公教家庭中长大，一旦你上了大学，一 旦你开始独立生活，你很可能至少有时还会望弥撒。 If you grew up in a traditional Catholic household, there's a good chance you still go to mass at least sometime once you're in college, once you're kind of on your own.
也许不像你应该那么频繁，但你完全不望弥撒的可能性大 约是四分之一，或者稍微多一点，27% 和 29%。 Maybe not as often as you should, but, uh, the odds that you're going to mass not at all are about one in four, maybe a little, a little more than one in four, 27 and 29%.
另一方面，如果你在自由派公教家庭中长大，你完全不再去教会的可能性略高于五五开。 On the other hand, if you were raised in a liberal Catholic household, it's slightly better than 50/50 odds that you don't go to church at all anymore already.
我的意思是，在离家五年内。 I mean, within five years of leaving home.
相比之下，在自由派公教家庭中长大的人中，只有 6% 每周望弥撒， 而在温和派或传统派家庭中长大的，这一比例为 17% 到 21%。 And in contrast, only 6% of those who grew up in a liberal Catholic house attend mass weekly compared to 17 to 21% of those in a moderate or traditional house.
当然，这些数字仍然不好，不要误会我的意思。 Now, those are still bad numbers, don't get me wrong.
嗯，它们应该是，每个人都应该是 100%。 Uh, they should be, everyone should be 100%.
拜托。 Come on.
但你可以看到，在望弥撒方面，在参与任何与信仰相关的事情方面，存在着相当大的差异。 But you can see there is a pretty massive disparity, uh, in terms of, uh, mass attendance, in terms of, uh, participation in anything related to the faith.
所以再说一次，你可以更深入地研究数据，因为它不仅 仅是参加教会活动，还包括像个人祈祷这样的事情。 So again, you can get more into the data because it's not just church attendance, it's also things even like personal prayer.
嗯，所有这些都表明存在一条自由派与保守派的发展轨迹。 Um, so all of that suggests that there is a liberal versus conservative trajectory.
再说一次，我们这里主要指的是神学上的。 Again, theologically primarily is what we mean here.
政治上会有一些重叠，但这并不意味着完全相同。 Politically, there's gonna be some overlap, but those don't mean the exact same thing.
我认为值得分开讨论的第二件事是，我看到几乎 所有人在解读皮尤研究中心的数据时都弄错了。 The second thing I think is worth breaking out is something that I've seen almost everybody get wrong about the Pew Research data.
我会这样说，我认为「坏消息是旧闻，好消息是新闻」。 And I would put it like this, I'd say the bad news is old news and the good news is new news.
我的意思是这样。 And here's what I mean by that.
当你听到这些关于加入公教会的人数与离开公教会的人数相比的数字时， 它给人的印象是，这是过去一年加入的人数与过去一年离开的人数相比。 When you hear these numbers about the number of people joining the Catholic church compared to leaving the Catholic church, the impression it creates is that this is how many people have just joined like in the last year compared to just left in the last year.
人们经常这样描述，嗯，甚至包括我亲爱的同事 Trent Horn 这样的人。 And it's often described that way, uh, even by people like my beloved colleague, Trent Horn.
「换句话说，这项研究表明，每有 100 人成为新教徒，就有 180 人离开新教。 "To put it another way, the study says that for every 100 people who become Protestant, 180 people leave Protestantism.
然而，每有 100 人成为公教徒，就有 840 人离开公教，每 有 100 人成为有宗教信仰的人，就有 590 人放弃宗教。」 However, for every 100 people who become Catholic, 840 people leave Catholicism, and for every 100 people who become religious, 590 people give up religion."
这并不是要制造紧张气氛，但 Trent 在时态上实际上是技术性错误。 And not to make for a tense situation, but Trent's actually technically wrong there about the tenses.
而且不只是 Trent，我看到所有报道这些数据的人都这样， 嗯，只是我喜欢单独挑出 Trent，因为我喜欢 Trent ，而且我很少能在观点上胜过他，我很高兴在这里尝试这样做。 And it's not just Trent, it's everybody I've seen cover this data, uh, it's just, I like singling out Trent 'cause I, I like Trent and 'cause I rarely get to get a point over on him, and I'm, I'm happy to try to do so here.
但实际上并非每有 100 人加入公教会，就有 840 人离开。 But it's actually not the case that for every 100 people who join the Catholic church, 840 people leave.
这样说太偏向现在时了。 That puts it too much in the present tense.
而是说，在现在活着并接受调查的人中，每有 100 位 加入公教会的人，就有 840 位已经离开了公教会。 It's that for every 100 people alive and being surveyed now who have joined the Catholic Church, 840 people have left the Catholic Church.
这实际上非常重要，因为关键在于，皮尤研究中心在其整体研究 中提出的观点是，我们看到了人们普遍离开基督教，特别是离开 公教的大规模转变，但这种大规模的离开似乎已经放缓了不少。 That actually matters a great deal because the whole point, and actually the point Pew is making in their overall study, is that we've seen this massive shift of people leaving Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular, but that massive, like, exodus seems to have slowed quite a bit.
这是个好消息，但如果你认为 8.4 比 1 的离开与加入比例仍在持续，那就不是好消息了。 Which is good news, but not if you think that the 8.4 to one ratio of, of exiting to leaving is still ongoing.
它，它不是。 It, it's not.
相反，情况是这样的。 Rather, here's the case.
他们调查的所有达到年龄的美国成年人的年龄中位数是 48 岁，基督徒是 54 岁，没有宗教信仰的人是 38 岁。 The median age of people that they're, uh, surveying among all US adults meeting age is 48, among Christians is 54, among the religiously unaffiliated it's 38.
所以，好吧，如果你以一个 48 岁的人为例，只是取中位数，他们更有可能是 在基督教家庭长大然后离开，还是在没有宗教信仰的家庭长大然后成为基督徒？ So okay, if you take a 48-year-old, just to take the median example, is it more likely that they grew up in a Christian home and left it or grew up in a non-religious home and became Christian?
嗯，显然他们更有可能是在基督教家庭长大然后离开，因为从历史上看，嗯，我 们曾经是一个更偏向基督教的国家，所有这些在数据中都非常清楚地体现出来。 Well, obviously it's more likely that they grew up in a Christian home and left it because historically, uh, we were more of a Christian country, and you see all of that very clearly in the data.
所以，当然，你会看到离开的人数多于皈依的人数。 So, of course, you're going to get more of an exodus to incoming convert rate.
这样说吧——让我们想象一个假设。 To put it like this-Let's just imagine a hypothetical.
假设，通过一个奇迹，在接下来的一年里，没有一个人离开公教会。 Let's say, through a miracle, for the next year, not one person left the Catholic church.
没有人放弃成为公教徒。 Nobody gave up on being Catholic.
再假设皈依公教的人数翻倍、三倍，或者更多。 And let's say the number of people who converted to Catholicism doubles, triples, whatever.
即使在这种情况下，这无疑是一场复兴，无疑是一场不可思议的运动 ，你仍然会，至少一开始，看到前公教徒的人数远多于新公教徒。 Even in that case, which would be undeniably a revival, undeniably this incredible movement, you would still, at least at first, have a case where there were a lot more former Catholics than new Catholics.
为什么？ Why?
因为在过去的几十年里，前公教徒的人数更多，所以即使出现了新的生 命迹象，如果你只是看所有人的总数，无论他们是一周前还是 40 年前皈依的，那么你在数据中是看不到这一点的，至少一开始看不到。 Because there are more former Catholics over the past decades, so that even if there are new signs of life, if you're just looking at the overall number of everyone, whether they converted a- a week ago or 40 years ago, well, then you're not gonna see that in the data, at least not at first.
如果你想这样说，就像你决定要健身一样，假设一个月后，你想追踪你的健身目标。 If you wanna put it like this, like if you decide you're gonna get in shape, let's say after a month, you want to track your fitness goals.
最好的办法是说：「一个月前我在哪里，现在我在哪里？」如果你说：「2 0 年前我在哪里，现在在哪里」，那可能不是一个很有用的衡量标准。 Your best bet is to say, "Where was I a month ago compared to where am I now?" If you say, "Where was I 20 years ago compared to now," that's probably not a very helpful rubric.
所以皮尤数据的问题不在于它错了，而在于它过于宽泛，没有帮助。 And so the problem with the Pew data isn't that it's wrong, it's that it's unhelpfully broad.
就像它确实告诉我们一些重要的事情，但不是人们认为它告诉我们的。 Like it actually tells us something important, but not what people think it tells us.
它没有告诉我们当前的状态，它告诉我们的是过去的状态。 It doesn't tell us the current state, it tells us the prior state.
正如皮尤数据的其余部分所示，基督教总体上出现了大规模的 衰落，但正如他们承认的，在过去几年里发生了一些事情。 And as the rest of the Pew data shows, there has been a mass decline in Christianity overall, but as they acknowledge, something has happened in the last few years.
我们实际上在不同的人口统计数据和年龄段中都看到了这一点，正如他们所 说，自 2020 年以来，美国不同出生队列的宗教稳定性迹象存在。 And we see this actually across demographics, across ages, that, as they put it, since 2020, signs of religious stability across birth cohorts in the United States exist.
他们，如果你看看每天祈祷的人数、自称是基督徒的人数，以及有宗教 信仰的人数，我们会发现在过去五年里发生了一些令人着迷的事情。 They, if you look at the number of people who pray daily, the number of people who describe themselves as Christian, and then the number of people who are religiously affiliated, we see in the last five years something kind of fascinating.
它稳定下来了。 It stabilized.
事实上，最令人好奇的是，如果你看看最年轻的一代，也就是 18 到 24 岁的人，那些你认为会大批离开基督教的人，他们自称 是基督徒的比例从之前的 45% 上升到了现在的 51%。 In fact, the most curious thing is that if you look at the youngest generation, those, uh, aged 18 to 24, the people you would expect to be leaving Christianity in droves, they went from 45% of them self-describing as Christians before to now 51%.
所以你实际上看到在几个年轻的群体中，包括像我这样 34 到 44 岁的人群，他们现在自称是基督徒的可能性比 2020 年更高。 And so you actually see among, uh, a couple of the younger cohorts, also the- the cohort of those aged 34 to 44, like myself, uh, they're actually more likely t- to say they're Christian now than they were in 2020.
这更加引人注目，因为在这期间，你还有像新冠疫情这样的事情发生。 Which is all the more remarkable, because in there, you also have things like COVID.
你还有像教会关闭、人们无法参加教会活动这样的事情。 You also have things like, you know, churches shutting down and people being cut off from church attendance.
所有这些，所有我们认为会在数字上造成绝对灾难的事情，但我们没有看到数字上的灾难。 And all of this, all this stuff that we thought was gonna be absolutely catastrophic in the numbers, and we don't see catastrophe in the numbers.
现在，需要明确的是，如果你问「过去 50 年是什么样的？」，那确实是 相当灾难性的。但如果你问「过去 5 年是什么样的？」，嗯，出奇地好。 Now, to be clear, in the long term it's been pretty catastrophic if you say, "What's the last 50 years looked like?" But if you ask, "What does the last five years look like?" Well, surprisingly good.
好得出乎我们任何人的意料。 Surprisingly better than I think any of us would have expected.
现在，这实际上与 Christian Smith 和他的合著 者提出的观点非常吻合，那就是关于美国公教徒，特别是年轻公教徒 的故事，我们正在处理过去大约 50 年来发生许多事情的后果。 Now, this actually dovetails nicely, uh, with the point that Christian Smith and his co-authors make, which is that what we find in terms of, uh, the story of American Catholics, young Catholics, is that we're dealing with the fallout of a lot of stuff that's been going on since the last 50 years or so.
所以，正如他们解释的，当你比较 2014 年的公教青年（同样是 1 8 到 23 岁这个年龄段）和 1970 年代的公教青年时，他们发 现除了一个巨大的例外，他们的宗教信仰、态度和实践相对变化不大。 So, as they explain, when you compare Catholic young adults, again, that 18 to 23 range, in 2014 compared to those in the 1970s, they found that with one huge exception, w- there was relatively little change in their religious beliefs, attitudes and practices.
就像流行的说法是现代的公教徒比老一代的宗教信仰要少得多，反之亦然， 但至少截至 2014 年，也就是在这种放缓发生之前，就像在艰难时期 ，在宗教衰落停止之前，新兴的年轻公教徒看起来很像 1970 年代新 兴的年轻公教徒，但有一个重要的区别，那就是，嗯，弥撒参与率。 Like the popular narrative is the modern generation of Catholics is way less religious than the older generation or vice versa, and at least as of 2014, again, before this kind of slowdown, like in the- in the middle of the battle days, before the religious decline stopped, young emerging Catholics were looking a lot like young emerging Catholics in the 1970s, but with an important difference, namely, um, mass attendance.
所以这表明我们不应该只看过去几年发生的事情。 And so this suggests that what we're looking for shouldn't be anything in the last couple years.
比如这不是「哦，这是新无神论把所有人都带离基督教的故事」。不是那样的。 Like this is not, "Oh, this is the story of the new atheism taking everyone away from Christianity." It's not that.
还有别的事情一直在发生。 Something else has been going on.
而且，Radene Zoomer 在谈到 20 世纪中期在所有 这些不同新教教派中发生的这场神学自由化运动时，也指出了这一点。 And, and Radene Zoomer pointed it out when he talks about this theological liberalization project that- that happened in the mid 20th century in all these different Protestant denominations.
公教中也有类似的情况，而且我认为，从统计数据来看，这是灾难性的。 There's a version of that in Catholicism as well, and it's, I would argue, been disastrous, uh, statistically.
而且，嗯，所以我们看到的一个区别，就像我之前说的，是弥撒参与率。 And, uh, so the- the one difference that we see, as I said before, is mass attendance.
所以，在 20 世纪 70 年代，年轻的公教徒对于是否相 信教会教导的态度是模棱两可的，但他们仍然经常去参加弥撒。 So you had young Catholics in the 1970s who were so-so on whether they believed in church teaching, and they still often went to mass.
然后，在 21 世纪 10 年代，有一群看起来非常 相似的年轻公教徒，他们去参加弥撒的可能性就小多了。 And then you have a very similar looking group of young Catholics in the 2010s, and they're just less likely to go to mass.
当你把这放在 50 年的时间跨度里，并结合其他事情来看，你知道，这是皮 尤研究中心在 2014 年展示的修女和祭司人数，祭司人数下降了不少。 And when you put it in that 50-year trajectory and you couple it with things, you know, this was Pew in 2014 showing the number of religious sisters and the number of priests, the number of priests went down quite a bit.
修女人数从 1965 年的 18 万骤降到 2014 年的不到 5 万。 The number of religious sisters plummeted from 180,000 in 1965 to under 50,000 in 2014.
这是巨大的损失。 That's enormous loss.
所以即使我们已经稳定下来，当你与 1965 年甚 至 2007 年相比时，情况仍然会看起来很糟糕。 And so even if we've stabilized, when you compare it to 1965 or even 2007, things are still going to look bad.
但如果你认识到在更短的时间跨度内，流失可能已经减缓或停止了。 But if you recognize in a shorter time span, the bleeding may have slowed or stopped.
我想补充的另一件事，嗯，这与 Christian Smith 和他的同事们在《美国当代基督徒手册》中的发现相呼应，该手册发现 基本上婴儿潮一代，即使他们不再去教会，仍然称自己为基督徒。 The other thing I would add to this, uh, kind of echoing what Christian Smith and his colleagues found is, uh, from the Handbook of Contemporary Christian in the United States, which found that basically boomers, even when they dropped out of church, still called themselves Christian.
而年轻一代，即使他们相信完全相同的事情，也更不太可能使用基督徒这个标签。 Whereas younger generations who might believe e- exactly the same things are just less likely to use the label of Christian.
所以我们看到的一些现象并不是真正的神学差异。我们看到的一些现象只是人们对神学差异 的反应方式不同，过去对基督教感到不满的人可能仍然称自己为基督徒，可能仍然去教会。 So some of what we're seeing isn't an actual theological difference.Some of what we're seeing is just how people respond to the theological difference, that the person who'd become disaffected with Christianity in the past might still call themselves a Christian, might still go to church.
现在持有相同信仰的人，在停止相信后，更不太可能拥 有那种让他们继续保留基督徒标签的文化和社会联系。 The person with those same beliefs now is less likely to have the kind of cultural, social ties that keep them attached to the label after they've stopped believing in it.
所以这是一些坏消息，但我想把这和好消息结合起来。 So that's some of the bad news, but I want to couple that with the good news.
顺便说一下，好消息的一部分是，我们并没有看到人们只是推翻和拒绝基督教。 And, and part of the good news there, by the way, is that we aren't seeing people just overthrowing Christianity and rejecting it.
他们可能对自己的描述更诚实，或者对自己如何描述自己更具自我意识。 They may be more honest about their self-description or maybe more self-aware about their self-description.
但正如我所说，我们也看到，不仅仅是比例以一种 好的方式趋于稳定，还有这些微小的生命迹象。 But we also see, as I say, not just that the, the ratios kind of plateau in a good way, but also these little signs of life.
我之前提到过，但《支柱》杂志的 Luke Kaupin 实际上令人钦佩地 做了实地调查，让不同的教区报告今年复活节有多少皈依者，嗯，与去年相比。 Now I mentioned this earlier, but Luke Kaupin at the Pillar has actually admirably done the legwork of just getting different dioceses to report how many converts they had at Easter this year, uh, compared to last year.
这些数字确实令人振奋。 And the numbers are really heartening.
例如，巴尔的摩总教区去年有 669 人加入教会。 So for instance, the Archdiocese of Baltimore, last year they had 669 people come into the church.
今年有 778 人。 This year they had 778.
波士顿去年 360 人，今年 458 人。 Boston, last year, 360, this year, 458.
Arlington，我以前住的地方，去年 242 人，今年 291 人。 Arlington, where I used to live, 242 last year, 291 this year.
我也住在华盛顿特区。 I also lived in Washington DC.
他们去年有 1350 人，今年有 1500 多人。 They had 1,350 last year, 1,500, more than 1,500 people this year.
还有我所在的密苏里州堪萨斯城圣约瑟教区，去 年有 419 人，今年增加到 424 人。 And my own diocese here of Kansas City St. Joseph in Missouri, 419 people last year all the way up to 424 this year.
多了五个人。 Five extra people.
我的意思是，你看。 I mean, look.
如果我们为一个失丧的羊羔欢喜，那么为五个失丧的羊羔欢喜，那太好了。 If we're gonna rejoice over one lost sheep, five lost sheep, that's great.
所以我的重点是，确实有生命的迹象。 So my point there is that there are actual signs of life.
就像很容易就说：「哦，你知道，统计数据讲述了一个非常糟糕 的故事」，然后你只有这些轶事证据讲述了一个积极的故事。 Like it's easy to just say, "Oh, you know, the stats tell a very bad story," and then you just have this anecdotal evidence that tells a positive story.
这不仅仅是轶事证据。 This is something more than anecdotal evidence.
你至少有逐个教区、逐年的数字。 You at least have diocese by diocese, year to year numbers.
那是，那是数据。 That's, that's data.
现在我们应该对这些数据加以说明，正如 Kaupin 正确指出的那样 ，从那些情况良好、乐于报告逐年数字的教区获取这些数据可能更容易。 Now we should caveat that data, as, as Kaupin rightly does by pointing out that it might be easier to get this data from dioceses where things are going well, who are happy to report year over year numbers.
少数教区确实报告了一些负面数字，但总体而言，这是积极的。 A few dioceses do report, uh, some negative numbers, but overall, this is positive.
他还指出了逐年比较的缺点。 And he also points out year over year, the downside.
你知道，我一直在说你不想把时间跨度拉得太长。 You know, I've been talking a lot about you don't wanna spread it out too long.
你不想把 1950 年和 2024 年、2025 年进行比较。 You don't want to compare 1950 to 2024, 2025.
但另一方面，Kaupin 指出，我们只是在比 较去年和前年，这可能与十年前的情况非常不同。 But on the other hand, Kaupin points out, well, we are looking just at the last year compared to the year before, and that might be very different from something like 10 years ago.
所以这仍然是一个不完整的故事，但我认为它很有帮助，表明可能正在发生一些事情。 So it's still an incomplete story, but a, I think a helpful one that shows that something might be happening.
Kaupin 和 Brendan Hodge 也 指出，我们在法国和比利时等地看到了类似的数字。 And Kaupin has also pointed out, along with Brendan Hodge, that we see some similar numbers in places like France and Belgium.
所以仅看法国的成人洗礼和青少年洗礼人数，它们显著增加，不仅是比去 年，而是比报告追溯到的每一年都多，报告可以追溯到 2015 年。 So looking just at adult baptisms in France and adolescent baptisms in France, they're markedly up, not just from last year, but every year g- that the reporting goes back, which is to 2015.
增长了不少。 Like up quite a bit.
所以正在发生一些事情，我认为这非常好。 So something is happening, and I think it's really good.
现在，我想分解这些数字的最后一种方式是引用一个 流行的说法，即坏的公教徒变成了新教徒——嗯。 Now, the last way I wanna kind of break the numbers apart is by referring to a, a popular narrative that bad Catholics become Protestants- Mm-hmm.
... ...
而好的新教徒变成了公教徒。 and good Protestants become Catholics.
我想在某些方面挑战它，在某些方面接受它。 And I want to challenge it in some ways and, and accept it in some ways.
现在 Trent 对这种说法的一个版本持怀疑态度，我同意他对这个版本的怀疑。 Now Trent is, uh, skeptical of a version of this claim, and I agree with his skepticism of the version.
所以这是他的论点。 So here's his argument.
现在有些公教徒可能会安慰自己说，聪明的新教徒变成了公 教徒，而大量不太聪明或不太虔诚的公教徒变成了新教徒。 Now some Catholics may soothe themselves by saying that smart Protestants become Catholic, whereas the larger number of not so smart or less pious Catholics become Protestant.
所以这只是一个质量而非数量的问题。 So this is just an issue of quality over quantity.
嗯，这是一个没有多少证据支持的宏大说法。 Well, that's a grand claim with little evidence to back it up.
但假设这是真的。 But suppose it were true.
那又有什么关系呢？ Why does that matter?
一个人的价值不是来自他或她的智力。 A person's worth doesn't come from his or her intelligence.
而是来自他或她是按照神的形象和样式被造的事实。 It comes from the fact that he or she was made in the image and likeness of God.
所以我同意 Trent 的观点，我们不想表现得好像一个非常聪明、受过 良好教育的人的灵魂比一个不太聪明或受教育程度不高的人的灵魂更有价值。 So I agree with Trent that we don't want to act like the soul of like a really smart, well-educated person is worth more than the soul of someone who's not as smart or educated.
我... I...
这完全正确。 That's totally true.
但要理解这里正在发生的事情，认识到离开公教会的人往往 受教育程度较低，信仰形成也较差，这一点仍然很重要。 But it is nevertheless an important part of understanding what's going on here to recognize that it is also true that people who leave the Catholic Church tend to be way less educated and less well-formed.
这并不是说他们的灵魂不那么重要，而是为了诊断问题的本质，并提出一些非常好的消息。 That's not to say that their souls matter any less, but it is to diagnose the nature of the problem, and to suggest some really good news.
也就是说，当人们了解了故事的完整版本后，他们认识到公教是真实的比例要高得多。 Namely, that when people get a full version of the story, then they realize Catholicism is true at a much higher rate.
这，这太好了。 That's, that's great.
所以在 2009 年，这份报告在 2011 年修订过， 虽然还是很旧，但这，这是我从皮尤找到的最好的资料了。 So in 2009, and this was revised in 2011, it's still very old, but this is, uh, the best I could find from Pew.
他们专门研究了人们何时离开公教，他们发现，大约一半，也就是 48 % 现在没有宗教信仰的公教徒，在满 18 岁之前就离开了公教，相 比之下，现在是新教徒的人中，只有三分之一是在这个年龄之前离开的。 Uh, they looked specifically at when people leave Catholicism, and what they found is that about half, 48% of Catholics who are now unaffiliated left Catholicism before reaching the age of 18, compared to a third of those who are now Protestant.
所以，在青少年时期，甚至更早的时候，就出现了大规模的流失。 So there's a massive drop-off in the teenage years or, or even before.
在这两个群体中，另外还有十分之三，也就是 30%。 Among both groups, an additional 3 in 10, so 30%.
我不知道他们为什么从用百分比改成了用比例。 I don't know why they switched from doing percent to ratios.
十分之三的人在 18 到 23 岁的青年时期离开了公教会。 3 in 10 left the Catholic Church as young adults between 18 and 23.
那是 Christian Smith 正在研究的年龄段。 That's the age range Christian Smith is looking at.
现在没有宗教信仰的人中只有五分之一，现在是新教徒 的人中只有三分之一，是在满 24 岁之后离开的。 Only one-fifth who are now unaffiliated and one-third who are now Protestant departed after turning age 24.
这太惊人了。 That's massive.
这意味着如果你能成功地帮助一个人保持公教信仰直到 2 4 岁，从统计上看，他们极有可能终生保持公教信仰。 It means if you can successfully help someone stay Catholic to the age of 24, statistically, they're overwhelmingly likely to remain Catholic for life.
这至少表明，那些离开的人，并不是因为他们对这个问题进行了非常深入的研究。 And this is at least suggestive that the people leaving, it isn't because they've done some super deep dive on the issue.
无意冒犯正在观看的非常年轻的各位。但是，那些花了数年时间研究这个问题然后皈 依公教的知名皈依者，与那些只是说「我不想去望弥撒」的青少年之间是有区别的。 No offense to those of you watching who are very young.But there is a difference between the, you know, take the high-profile converts who have spent years studying the question and then convert to Catholicism compared to the teenager who just says, "I don't want to go to mass.
我父母不能强迫我。」然后就不去了。 My parents can't force me." And then stops going.
这不是说一个灵魂比另一个更有价值，而是这两种是截然不同的属灵轨迹。 It's not that one soul is more valuable than the other, but those are two very different spiritual trajectories.
果然，不仅仅是因为他们年轻，那些离开公教的人在儿 童时期去教会的频率也较低，在青少年时期则低得多。 And sure enough, it's not just that they're young, the people who leave Catholicism also attended church at a lower rate as children and a much lower rate, uh, as teenagers.
所以这已经给了我们一个线索，关于如何纠正人们离 开公教的问题，那就是每周都带你的孩子去教会。 So this is already gonna give us one clue towards how to correct the problem of people leaving Catholicism, which is just go to church with your kids every week.
从统计上看，他们极有可能，呃，保持公教信仰。 And statistically they're way more likely, uh, to remain Catholic.
现在我能找到的关于这方面的其他更近的数据，呃，来自使徒事业应用研究中心。 Now the other more recent data I could find on this is, uh, from the Center for the Applied Research of the Apostolate.
他们只研究了那些 18 到 25 岁之间离开教会的人。 And they were looking just at those aged 18 to 25 who had left the church.
所以这是一个不完美的数据集，因为显然你不会得到任何 25 岁以上离开的人。 So this is an imperfect dataset because obviously you're not gonna get anybody older than 25 leaving.
但尽管如此，在这个年龄段的人中，也就是大多数离 开公教的人，脱离公教的年龄中位数是 13 岁。 But nevertheless, among the people in that age range, which is most of the people who leave Catholicism, the median age at disaffiliation from Catholicism was 13 years old.
所以这将是等式中重要的一部分，因为如果你说：「嘿，你为什 么不多关注那些离开公教会的人呢？」嗯，首先，呃，看 Sh ameless Popery 的 13 岁孩子并不多。 So this is gonna be an important part of the equation, 'cause if you say, "Hey, why don't you focus more on those leaving the Catholic Church?" Well, for starters, uh, there aren't a lot of 13-year-olds who watch Shameless Popery.
如果他们有看的话，他们可能也不会离开公教会。 And if there are, they're not leaving the Catholic Church probably.
这些不是你需要争取的人。 These are not the ones you have to get.
所以仅仅将此理解为诊断人们为何离开的问题的一部分，就是 认识到，是的，绝大多数人离开是因为他们对公教了解不够。 And so just understanding this as part of diagnosing the problem of why people leave is just recognizing, yeah, overwhelmingly people leave because they don't know enough about Catholicism.
他们觉得教会的礼拜不有趣，他们不理解神学，他们 没有联系，他们不祈祷，等等，然后他们就离开了。 They don't find the church services interesting, they don't understand the theology, they're not connected, they don't pray, et cetera, and then they leave.
现在这些是需要解决的问题。 Now those are problems that need to be solved.
但这些解决方案可能不会来自像 YouTube 频道这样的地方。 But those solutions are probably not going to come from something like a YouTube channel.
它们会以不同的方式出现。 They're gonna come in different ways.
我们会在最后谈论这个问题。 We're gonna talk about that at the very end.
所以你可能会问：「那为什么人们不去教会呢？」幸 运的是，在 2018 年，皮尤也问了这个问题。 So then you say, "Well, why don't people go to church?" And fortunately, in 2018, Pew asked that as well.
他们发现，对于不去望弥撒的公教徒来说，这些人正在让他们的孩子不 再实践信仰，首要原因就是他们说他们以其他方式实践他们的信仰。 And what they found for Catholics who don't go to mass, these are the ones setting their kids up to not practice the faith anymore, the number one reason was they say they practice their faith in other ways.
现在我要提一下，公教会非常明确地指出，需要通过每周日去望弥撒来实践信仰。 Now I'll mention that the Catholic Church is very explicit about the, the need to practice it by going to mass every Sunday.
现在我们可以从数字中看到这为什么重要。 And we can now see in the numbers why that matters.
Practicing the faith in other ways i s a pretty strong guarantee your kid is not going to continue to even se lf-describe as a Catholic Christian. Practicing the faith in other ways is a pretty strong guarantee your kid is not going to continue to even self-describe as a Catholic Christian.
第二大原因就是：「我没时间。」所以每周一小时，对于望弥 撒来说，给神的时间太多了，这不是一种神学上的反对意见。 The second-biggest reason was, "I don't have time." So an hour a week, too much to give for God in terms of going to mass, this is not a theological kind of objection.
这只是一种耸耸肩的态度，再次表明这里的问题更像是冷淡，而不是原则性的反对。 This is just a sort of shrug of the shoulder, which suggests that it, again, the issue here is something more like lukewarmness than a principled objection.
然后第三个原因是：「我没有找到我喜欢的教会或礼拜场所。 」哦，抱歉，实际上第二和第三个原因并列，都是 19%。 And then third, "I haven't found a church or house of worship that I like." That's, uh, oh, actually, sorry, the second and third are actually tied, both 19%.
这些就是原因。 Those are the reasons.
所以如果你想总结一下，我会说，我们面临的问题是，很多自称是公教徒的人 ，他们可能在机构上有所联系，就像过去的主流派一样，但联系非常松散。 And so if you, you want to sum up that, I would say, we have a problem of a lot of people who self-describe as Catholic, who might be affiliated institutionally, like the mainliners of old, who are only loosely connected.
他们可能会送孩子去公教学校，他们自己可能也上 过公教学校，但他们对与耶稣建立关系并不认真。 They might send their kids to Catholic school, they might go to Catholic school, but they aren't serious about a relationship with Jesus.
他们对过公教徒的生活并不认真。 They aren't serious about living the life of a Catholic.
所以需要做的是，一部分是说服他们，一部分是激发他们在这方面的兴趣。 And so what has to happen is partly to convince them, partly to stir up interest in that.
考虑到这一点，我想谈谈两篇文章，它们是针对成功的 公教护教学的兴起而写的，可以说是反对这种趋势。 Now with that in mind, I wanted to turn to a pair of articles written to, uh, sort of speak out against the, the rise of successful Catholic apologetics.
其中一篇是安德鲁·沃格特（Andrew Vogt）的文章，你可 能看过，发表在《福音联盟》（The Gospel Coalit ion）2025年3月号上，题为「罗马公教护教学在网上激增。 One of those is Andrew Vogt's article you may have seen, uh, March 2025 for The Gospel Coalition called "Roman Catholic apologetics is surging online.
目标读者：新教徒。」另一篇是今年四月亚伦·雷恩（Aaron Wrenn）发表在《美国改革者》（The American Reformer）上的文章，我喜欢这个标题的阴谋论色彩。 Intended audience: Protestants." And then the other is from April of this year, uh, by Aaron Wrenn at The American Reformer, and I like how conspiratorial the title is.
他说：「罗马对新教精英的战略性举动。」每当有人用「罗马」来形容从梵蒂冈到在网上表 达观点的普通公教徒的一切时，我们可以说，这其中存在着对细微差别的某种缺乏理解。 He says, "Rome's strategic play for Protestant elites." And anytime someone says Rome to describe everything from, like, the Vatican to, like, an ordinary Catholic expressing their views online, there's a certain lack of a grasp of the nuances, we'll say.
但我喜欢雷恩的说法，因为有些地方我确实同意他的 观点，而有些地方我只是觉得我们处于不同的世界。 But I like how Wrenn puts it because there's some areas I actually agree with him on, and some areas where I just think we're in different worlds.
所以他说，首先，「值得注意的是，公教皈依主要是一种精英现象。 So he says, first, "It's worth noting that Catholic conversions are primarily an elite phenomenon.
对于没有大学学历的人来说，他们更有可能离开公教 成为福音派。」没错，这实际上是问题的一部分。 For those without college degrees, it's more likely that people leave Catholicism to become evangelical." So right, that's actually part of the problem.
成为新教徒的人，很多不仅仅是未受过教育的人，字面上就是青少年。 People becoming Protestant, a lot of it is not just the uneducated, it's literally teenagers.
他们是那些很少接触到我们实际谈论的任何神学方面事情的来龙去脉的人。 It's people who have very little exposure to any of the ins and outs of the theological things we're actually talking about.
所以换句话说，一个人越不了解正在发生的事情，他们就越有可能成为福音派。 So another way to put this is, the less someone understands what's going on, the more likely they are to become an Evangelical.
他们越了解正在发生的事情，他们就越有可能成为公教徒。 The more they understand what's going on, the more likely they are to become Catholic.
现在，如果你愿意，你可以用精英主义的语言来说。 Now you can put that in elitist language if you want.
我只是用信息的语言来说。 I just put that in information language.
比如，一个人在这些问题上受教育程度越高，他们就越有可能成为公教徒，这就是 为什么我认为说「受教育程度低且不虔诚的公教徒更可能成为新教徒」很重要。 Like, the better educated a person is on these questions, the more likely they are to become Catholic, which is why I think it matters to say, "Poorly educated and non-pious Catholics are more likely to become Protestant.
而虔诚、受过教育的新教徒则经常被公教会吸引。」这当然有大量的轶事证据支持。 Whereas pious, educated Protestants are often drawn towards the Catholic Church." This is certainly backed up by a wealth of anecdotal evidence.
我的意思是，看看那些高知名度的新教徒皈依公教的例子并不难。 I mean, it's not hard to look at high-profile Protestant converts to Catholicism.
我知道卡梅隆·贝尔图齐的名字经常在这个讨论中出现。 I know Cameron Bertuzzi's name often comes up in this discussion.
但反面情况在哪里呢？ But where is the flip side?
哪里有，比如，一个知名的…… Where is, like, a well-known......
在信仰上很深的公教徒，在他成年后变成了新教徒。 deep in the faith Catholic who became Protestant in, in his adult life.
我很难说出一个名字。 I would struggle to name one.
现在，这是轶事吗？ Now, is that anecdotal?
当然。 Sure.
但这是有我们看到的所有统计证据支持的轶事，而且我认为这很有说服力。 But it's anecdotal backed up by all the statistical evidence we've seen, and I think it's quite telling.
这很有说服力，因为它意味着问题不在于我们这边没有真理。 It's telling because it means the problem isn't that we don't have the truth on our side.
我们有。 We do.
人花越多时间和精力去深入研究，去查看不同的主张，并 真正倾听双方的观点，我们就越会发现他们皈依公教。 And the more people take the time and the trouble to dig through the research and to look at the different claims and to actually listen to both sides, the more we find them converting to Catholicism.
问题不在于我们这边没有真理。 The problem isn't that we don't have the truth on our side.
问题在于首先要让人们对真理产生兴趣。 The problem is getting people interested in the truth in the first place.
这就是为什么会有那些冷淡和不满的公教徒离开。 Which is why you have lukewarm and disaffected Catholics who, who leave.
我们在数据中看到了这一点。 We see it in the data.
但我想回到雷恩的观点，因为他说：「我注意到在社交媒体互 动中，福音派人士被公教或东正教人士超越的情况并不少见。 But I wanted to turn back to Wren, 'cause he says, "I notice that it's not uncommon to see social media interactions in which Evangelicals are outclassed by Catholic or Orthodox counterparts.
如果公教徒在互动中采取策略，避开那些可能有更 好答案的更复杂的新教思想家，我不会感到惊讶。 I wouldn't be surprised if the Catholics were being strategic in their interactions, avoiding more sophisticated Protestant thinkers who might have better answers.
如果他们这样做，那会很聪明。」作为一名公教徒，我只想说，不是这样的。 If they are, this would be smart." And I'll just say as a Catholic, no.
这里发生的事情不是那样。 That's not what's happening here.
就像 Catholic Answers（公教问答）一样，我 来说说 Catholic Answers 这个组织的存在。 Like Catholic Answers, I'll speak to the existence of Catholic Answers as an organization.
Catholic Answers 的创立是因为有一天 Karl Keating 从教堂出来，发现停车场里所有汽车的挡风玻璃上都被基要派人士贴满了反公教的传单。 Catholic Answers was created when Karl Keating came out of church one day and found that, uh, fundamentalists had papered all of the windshields in the parking lot with anti-Catholic tracts.
他想：「这具有误导性，那些不了解自己信仰的人可能会被骗入歧途。 And he thought, "This is misleading and someone who doesn't know their faith well might be duped into error.
我需要回应。」Catholic Answers 就由此诞生了。 I need to answer this." And Catholic Answers was born from this.
标题里就写得很清楚，其主要目的是回应公教徒遇到的反对意见，而 碰巧的是，新教徒中最响亮、最受欢迎的反对意见往往是最糟糕的。 It's right there in the title, the point was primarily to respond to the objections Catholics were getting, and it happens that the loudest and most popular Protestant objections are often the worst.
即使是受过良好教育的新教徒听到这些论点也会觉得：「哦，这太荒谬了。 And well-formed Protestants even hear these arguments and think, "Oh, this is ridiculous.
这太蠢了。」公教徒并没有什么阴谋让这些论点成为最受欢迎的，对吧？ That's stupid." There's no Catholic conspiracy to make those the most popular arguments, right?
你知道，我经常听到这种说法，当我回应一个流行的新教论点时，它会很愚蠢， 然后评论区里一些聪明的新教徒就会说：「哦，那是稻草人论证。」不，不。 You, you know, I, I hear this all the time, where I'll respond to a popular Protestant argument and it'll be dumb, and some smart Protestant in the comments will be like, "Oh, that's a straw man." No, no.
看看观看次数。 Look at the view count.
我不是在选择一些奇怪的边缘观点。 I'm not choosing some weird fringe view.
我是在回应那些非常流行的观点，而他们希望我回应的人往往是那些频道只有 500 次观看的非常学术的新教徒，你会觉得：「嗯，那些不是需要立即回应 的紧急需求。」所以没错，并非所有新教徒都相信每一个愚蠢、糟糕的论点。 I'm responding to the very popular views, and then the people they're wanting me to respond to are often these, like, very academic Protestants who have 500 views on their channel, and you're like, "Well, th- those are not the immediate urgent needs that need to be responded to." So it's true, not all Protestants believe every dumb, bad argument.
但是如果你正在回应那些确实相信愚蠢、糟糕论点的人，并且你能向他们展示：「 不，这是公教对此的回应，而且这是真实、美好、良善的」，你为什么不做呢？ But if you're responding to people who do believe the dumb, bad argument, and you can show them, "No, here's the Catholic answer to that, and this is true and good and beautiful," why would you not do that?
比如，说「好吧，我不能回应流行的谬误，因为它就是 谬误」会很奇怪。正因为它是谬误，你才要回应它。 Like, it would be bizarre to say, "Well, I can't answer the popular falsehood because it's false." That's why you answer it.
所以，其他新教徒可能有更细微的谬误，这些谬误更合理或错误不那么离谱，这没关系。 So the fact that other Protestants may have more nuanced falsehoods that are, are more plausible or less egregiously wrong, that's fine.
那也值得回应。 That's also worth addressing.
但让我们关注那些最大、最明显、最容易快速纠正的错误。 But let's focus on the, the biggest, kind of most obvious glaring errors that can be corrected quickly.
所以就我个人而言，我就是这么做的。 So speaking personally, that's, that's what I do.
我不认为有什么公教阴谋。 I don't think there's any Catholic conspiracy.
我认为，这类事情更容易做到。 I think it's, this is the kind of stuff that it's easier to do.
另一件事，我这么说也是真诚地向甚至反公教的新教徒表示赞赏和认 可，那就是新教徒，即使是那些可能憎恨公教会的人（我知道并非所 有新教徒都憎恨公教会），但在虔诚的新教徒中，你不会是冷淡的。 The other thing, and I say this as a genuine nod of, of appreciation and approval to even anti-Catholic Protestants, is Protestants, even those who, who may hate the Catholic Church, I know not all Protestants hate the Catholic Church, but among Protestants who are devout, you're not lukewarm.
所以我们可以讨论圣经说了什么，我不需要先花一 个小时来讨论你为什么应该关心圣经说了什么。 And so we can have the conversation about what scripture says, and I don't have to first have, like, an hour-long conversation about why you should care what scripture says.
我可以告诉你：「耶稣是这样教导的」，并在圣经中给你看，你会 说：「好的，我信耶稣，我信圣经。」然后我们可以从那里继续。 I can tell you, "Here's what Jesus teaches," and show you that in the Bible, and you'll say, "Okay, I believe in Jesus, I believe in the Bible." And we can move from there.
对于那些冷淡的人，我可以说：「嘿，你看，你正在过着这种罪恶的生 活，这在圣经中是完全明确禁止的」，而你得到的反应却是一种耸肩。 The lukewarm, I can say, "Hey, look, you're, you know, you're living this life of sin that is completely and explicitly forbidden in scripture," and you kinda get met with the shrug of the shoulder.
坦率地说，耸肩是对抗基督教最强有力的论点。 And the shrug of the shoulder, speaking very frankly, is the strongest argument against Christianity.
因为对于一个不在乎真理的人，你还能说什么呢？ Because what can you possibly say to someone who does not care about the truth?
所以，带着这个沉重的话题，让我们转向如何拥有、如何培养一场公教复兴？ So, on that dark note, let's turn to how do we have, how do we cultivate a Catholic revival?
显然，这是圣灵的工作。 Now, obviously, this is the work of the Holy Spirit.
我们不能替他做。 We can't do it for Him.
但我们能做的是清除一些反对意见，并且我们可以做 我们这边能做的事情，好让他能做他将要做的事情。 But what we can do is clear some of the objections, and we can do the things we can be doing on our ends so that He can do what He's going to do.
所以在那份皮尤研究报告中，我刚刚意识到所有的幻灯片上都写着 2005 年。 So in that Pew Research study, I just now realized it said 2005 apparently, uh, in all of the slides.
应该写 2025 年。 It should have said 2025.
好了。 There you go.
皮尤研究报告中写道：「在所有在宗教环境中长大的受访者中」，无论是新教、 公教、犹太教、伊斯兰教还是其他宗教，「那些在高度宗教化的家庭中长大的人 ，更有可能保留他们童年时期的宗教身份」。这只是一个基本的社会学观点。 In the Pew Research study, it says, "Among all respondents who were raised in a religion," whether it's Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim or some other religion, "those who are raised in highly religious homes are much more likely to have retained their childhood religious identity." Like, that's just a basic sociological point.
如果你向你的孩子灌输宗教很重要，他们长大后就更有可能认为宗教很重要。 If you instill the religion matters to your kids, they're much more likely to think the religion matters when they're adults.
如果你通过你的行动，而不仅仅是言语，灌输宗 教不重要，他们就更有可能认为宗教不重要。 If you instill that it doesn't, by your actions, not just by your words, they're much more likely to think that it doesn't.
事实上，在宗教环境中长大，并且在一个宗教非常重要的家庭中每周参加宗教仪式的 人中，有 74% 的人今天仍然认同他们童年时期的宗教，相比之下，在同样环境 中长大但现在声称没有宗教信仰的人占 15%，转信其他宗教的人占 10%。 Indeed, 74% of people who are raised in a religion and grew up attending weekly religious services in a family in which religion was very important still identify with their childhood religion today, compared to 15% who grew up in this environment who now say they have no religion, and 10% who've switched to a different religion.
所以如果你做两件事，第一，你每周都去望弥撒，第二，你真正向你的孩子 灌输这很重要，那么他们长大后继续实践信仰的可能性大约是四分之三。 So if you do two things, number one, uh, you go to mass every week, and, uh, number two, you really instill that this is important to your kids, you've got about a three out of four chance that they're going to continue practicing the faith in adulthood.
相比之下，那些在宗教环境中长大—— By contrast, those who g- were raised in a religion-...
但很少或从未参加宗教仪式，或者在一个宗教不太重要或根本不重要的家庭中长大的人。 but grew up seldom or never attending religious services, or in a family in which religion was not too important or not at all important.
不到一半的人仍然认同他们童年时期的宗教，40% 的人 现在没有宗教信仰，16% 的人现在信仰不同的宗教。 Fewer than half still identify with their fam- their childhood religion, 40% are now nothing, 16% are now a different religion.
现在，这里有一个令人担忧的原因，因为只有 26% 的父母每周带孩子去教堂。 Now, there's cause for alarm there because only 26% of parents are taking their kids to church, uh, every week.
欢迎回到 Jim 的杂谈。 That's pretty bad.
我是 Joe Heschmeyer，我想探讨一个问题：美国的 公教复兴是否正在进行中，或者美国的美国公教会是否正在衰落。 And of that group, 54% grew up going to church weekly, another 11% at least once or twice a month.
因为如果你在 Google 上搜索类似「公教会 大批」这样的词 ，至少根据我的经验，排在前两位的搜索结果是一个视频，解释为什么 公教徒正大批离开教会，以及为什么年轻男性正大批加入公教会。 So most parents today grew up going to church, most parents today don't go to church except v- very rarely.
你可能会问：「那么，哪一个是对的呢？」答案在某种程度上是两者都对。 That's a problem for the next generation.
所以，这不仅仅是你用 Google 搜索时弹出的前两个视频。 We can stop that problem by getting parents who care even a little bit about Christianity to go back to mass, to go back to church.
你会找到各种看似矛盾的资料。 If you won't do it for your own sake, do it for the sake of your children because we can see in the numbers that it makes a huge difference.
所以最近，《纽约邮报》刊登了一篇文章，讲述了年 轻人大批皈依公教的情况，并分享了一些个人故事。 Second, turning back to this book, we can see the importance of things like prayer and Bible reading.
但你也会看到像 Eric Salmon 的文章，其中提到每有 100 位新公教徒，就有 800 人离开美国的公教会，而且 这些数字实际上比听起来还要糟糕，这很符合《危机》杂志的风格。 Now, this is one area where, uh, even traditional Catholics weren't great.
甚至我的朋友兼同事 Trent Horn 最近也制作了一个视频， 讲述了他认为为什么新教正在获胜，以及这对公教徒提供了什么教训。 Like there's clearly a lot of room, and I think this is something where Catholics could learn a lot from ordinary Protestants about just inculcating a spirit of prayer and reading of scripture with your kids.
现在，我想在这个问题上部分同意每个人的观点，也部分不同意每个人的 观点，因为造成这种困惑的不仅仅是标题，也包括当你深入研究数据时。 So to do things like just sit in the living room chair and read scripture in the morning, have a little time for personal meditation, invite your kids to come sit on your lap if they're of an age where that's normal and read scripture with them, let them at least see you reading scripture.
所以 Trent 和 Eric 以及那些关注一些令人担忧 迹象的人，主要是在看皮尤研究中心今年二月发布的一项研究。 Let this be something that they normalize and think is part of what it is to be an adult Christian and then encourage them to do the same.
尽管这项研究的标题是《美国基督教衰落放缓，可能已趋于稳定》，但文 章中关于美国公教会现状的一些消息却相当难看，特别是提到每有 10 0 人加入，就有大约 840 人离开了公教，转向了其他信仰。 Now, there's all sorts of other ways you can do this as well.
接受这些离开者最多的实际上并不是新教。 Um, there's a great amount of religious programming, things like Formed.
大多数是变成了没有宗教信仰的人。 If you're not familiar with Formed, uh, you can get the app.
事实上，新教也在挣扎，只是当你看到那些数字时，挣扎程度远不如美国的公教。 They have a bunch of programming.
然而，其他一些数字却讲述了一个稍微不同的故事。 They've got a lot of stuff online.
现在，这有点棘手，因为它没有系统地组织起来，但我知道《支柱》杂志，特别是 Luke Coffman，在逐个教区收集成人洗礼人数的证据方面做得很好。 You can watch religious shows.
我们看到在很多情况下，成人洗礼人数大幅增加。 There's a lot of good Protestant content for kids as well.
我稍后会更详细地介绍这些数据。 There's, uh, I mean, we do like a whole series of Bible stories with our kids that they listen to or they used to listen to at night before they'd go to sleep and they learned scripture that way just by hearing these stories and then a song at five and three.
但我只是想提出一个问题：我们如何看待这一切？ You ask them now like what happens after the Exodus, they'll tell you Joshua.
我们正在看到一场复兴吗？ It's like, "Hey, that's great." They know the stories, they're familiar, the Bible isn't daunting and unfamiliar.
我们正在看到公教在美国的消亡吗？ That's a good first start.
或者情况更复杂一些？ There's no guarantee they're gonna stay religious their whole life, it's no promise that your kids will stay religious their whole life, but these are concrete things we can do.
正如你可能猜到的，我会说情况更复杂一些，尽管我确实认为有真实、良好、合 理的理由抱有希望，认为一场真正的复兴正在悄然发生，并且处于早期阶段。 If the problem is in many ways won or lost before they turn 13 in the numbers, then this means a lot of the solution is working on the family.
现在下定论还为时过早，但我们正看到一种潜在的转变。 Strikingly, the story of whether they should go to Catholic school is a little more complicated.
但要理解这一点，我们必须知道如何分析数据，这有几个原因使得情况很棘手。 Uh, Smith and his colleagues found that it was unclear whether Catholic schooling actually made a difference.
首先，虽然新教被分为福音派和主流派基督徒，但当你查看皮尤研究中心等机构的数 据时，通常实际上是主流派新教徒、福音派新教徒和历史上的黑人新教徒，因为这些 群体，尽管都属于广义的新教范畴，但在社会学上差异很大，运作方式也不同。 On the one hand, kids who went to Catholic school were much more religious later on.
这将非常重要，因为公教没有这些官方的区分。 On the other hand, it seems to have been attributable to the fact that the kind of parents who send their kids to Catholic school are the kinds that are already doing all the right things, they're instilling the importance of faith in their kids.
你不会去一个公教会，然后看到它写着：「我们是主流派公教会」，或者 「我们是福音派公教会」。但尽管如此，我们也可以有一些类似的情况。 But in a powerful way, one thing that's an important component of this is the role of fathers.
在一些重要方面也会有所不同。 So Smith and his colleagues said, "Our interview data..." So this is, by the way, they did like broad level, uh, data and then they also did interviews with some like portion of the 18 to 23-year-old Catholics that they were looking at, both those who continued to practice their faith and those who stopped.
他们发现，在他们的访谈数据中，父亲的宗教信仰和实践 在决定儿子和女儿的宗教轨迹方面起着特别重要的作用。 And they found in their interview data is that the religious faiths and practices of fathers play a particularly important role in determining the religious trajectories of both their sons and their daughters.
他们说这条规则有例外，但这些例外是针对一条明确规则的例外。 And they said there are exceptions to this rule, but they are exceptions to a clear rule.
例如，在他们的研究数据中，就像在访谈数据中一样，没有一个疏远的 成年子女，没有一个疏远的成年子女的父亲是一位积极参与的公教徒。 Not a single estranged emerging adult, for example, in their research data, like in the interview data, not of anyone, not a single estranged emerging adult had a father who was an engaged Catholic.
所以你在数据中非常清楚地看到的一点是，如果一 位家长参与其中而另一位不参与，那就会有问题。 So one of the things that you see very clearly in the data is if one parent is in and the other one isn't, that's a problem.
如果妈妈试图让所有人都去教堂而爸爸不在乎，这种情况尤其如此。 And this is particularly the case if mom is trying to get everyone to go to church and dad doesn't care.
所以父亲们尤其要非常认真对待这件事。 So fathers especially take this very seriously.
关于这本书的研究数据，我想指出的最后一点是，他们研究了四种不同 的轨迹，这些轨迹决定了后来成为一个成功的、实践宗教的公教徒。 The last thing I'd point out in terms of just the research data from the book is that they looked at four different kind of trajectories for, for what made, uh, for a successful kind of religiously practicing Catholic later on.
他们研究了这样的情况：如果父母基本上非常认真对待信仰，然后他们有一个认真对待 信仰的社交圈子，某种同伴网络，遇到信仰问题可以求助的人，精神支持系统等等。 And it looked at things like if basically if parents took the faith very seriously and then they had a social group that took the faith seriously, some kind of peer network, people they could turn to with questions of faith, spiritual support system, et cetera.
而且，你知道，理想情况下如果他们上了公教学校，但即使没上，效 果也相当好，那么他们很可能，更有可能，在五年后仍然实践信仰。 And, you know, ideally if they went to Catholic school, but it worked pretty well even if they didn't, then they were pretty well likely, more likely than not, to still be practicing the faith five years later.
所以他们研究了这些不同的轨迹，我们可以说这些是一些成功的秘诀。 So they look at these different trajectories and so we can say these are some of the recipes for success.
但最后，我实际上想以 Trent 给出的一些建议来 结束，因为你们中有些观看者当然还没有自己的家庭。 But then finally, I want to actually, uh, end with some advice that Trent gave because some of you watching of course don't have families of your own.
这个建议对你来说可能还不相关，也许永远都不会相关。 This advice isn't relevant for you yet, maybe won't ever be relevant for you.
或者你的孩子已经离家了，他们已经做出了决定，而你正在处理由此产生的结果。 Or you've got kids who they're already out of the house, they've already made their decisions and, and you're dealing with the outcome of that.
但正如 Trent 指出的，考虑到大量冷淡或前公教徒的人数 ，一旦你这样诊断问题，你处理问题的方式就会变得相当不同。 But as Trent points out, given the sheer number of people who are lukewarm or ex-Catholics, once you diagnose a problem that way, it becomes pretty different kind of how you approach it.
换句话说，通常需要的不是精英解决方案，用 Ren 的话说。 That, in other words-What's needed is often not the elite solution, uh, to use Ren's language.
我们不需要总是对所有事情都有这种超深入、长达一小时的神学答案。 We, we don't need to always have this super in-depth, hour-long theological answer to everything.
有时候，仅仅邀请人们去教堂就足够了。 Sometimes it's enough to just invite people to church.
无论解决方案是什么，在我们所做的一切事情中，从讲道、教学 到平信徒与他们遇到的每个人互动，将我们的公教信仰视为关乎 属灵生死的大事，都需要成为我们应对这场危机的一部分。 Whatever the solution is, treating our Catholic faith as a matter of spiritual life and death in everything we do, from preaching, to teaching, to laypeople's interactions with everyone they meet, needs to be a part of our response to this crisis.
而且这必须在现实生活中进行，而不仅仅是在网上。 And it has to be done in real life, not just online.
因为如果网上皈依者和回归者想要回到信仰的家，他们 需要在现实世界中找到一个正统且具有吸引力的地方。 Since online converts and reverts need an orthodox inviting place in the real world if they want to come home to the faith.
请记住，你遇到的每八个人中就有一个是前公教徒。 Keep in mind that one in every eight people you meet is a former Catholic.
八分之一。 One in eight.
所以一个简单的邀请去望弥撒就能产生很大的影响。 So a simple invitation to attend mass can go a long way.
25 年前，我高中一个女孩邀请我去望弥撒。 25 years ago, a girl at my high school invited me to mass.
它改变了我的生活，因此也改变了无数其他人的生活。 It changed my life and consequently it changed the lives of countless other people.
所以我就以此结束。 So I'll just close with that.
你知道，当你问那些确实成为公教徒的人为什么会成为 公教徒时，他们经常会提到他们生命中某个人的经历。 You know, frequently when you ask people who do become Catholic why they became Catholic, they'll point to the experience of somebody in their life.
如果你身处一个非常知识分子的圈子，你可能认识很多通过理性思考皈依公教的人。 And if you run in a really intellectual circle, it may be that you know a lot of intellectual converts to Catholicism.
但有许多人，而且还需要更多有不同经历的人，他们只需要有人在精神上支持他 们，只需要有人像那个年轻女子邀请 Trent 去教堂一样邀请他们去教堂 ，只需要有人陪伴他们进行一场你可能甚至不知道他们正在进行的属灵探索。 But there are both many and there's a need for many more people who have different journeys, who just need someone to be there for them spiritually, who need someone to just invite them to church the way that young woman invited Trent to church, who just need someone to accompany them on a spiritual search maybe you're not even aware they're going on.
所以无论你是否认为自己是一位装备精良的公教护教者，我都会传达这 一点：照顾好你的家人，帮助他们灌输信仰，并通过邀请他们分享耶稣 基督在他公教会里的丰富和奇妙，来照顾好神放在你生命中的人。 So whether you consider yourself a well-equipped Catholic apologist or not, I would impart that, that take care of your family, help instill the faith in them, and take care of those God's put in your life by inviting them to share in the riches and wonder of Jesus Christ in his Catholic church.
这里是 Shameless Popery，我是 Joe Heschmeyer。 For Shameless Popery, I'm Joe Heschmeyer.
神祝福你。 God bless you.