Dr. Sproul, after Dr. Meyer’s talk, back here in the room, you mentioned, boy, that’s great apologetics. And there’s a question here asking an apologetical method question. Can you explain the difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics? And maybe elaborate on what you meant by even Dr. Meyer’s talk and how you thought that that was a well-presented apologetical argument within a framework of the different schools of thought of approaching apologetics.

斯普罗尔博士，在梅耶博士的演讲之后，你在房间里提到，那真是很棒的护教学。这里有一个问题，询问护教学方法的问题。你能解释一下预设护教学和古典护教学的区别吗？或许可以详细说明一下你对梅耶博士演讲的看法，以及你认为那是一个在不同护教学思想体系框架内呈现得很好的护教学论证。

SPROUL JR.: There are different schools of thought with respect to apologetics. I can think of at least three right off the bat. There’s presuppositionalism, and there are different schools of that. There’s axiomatic presuppositionalism that follows Gordon Clark, and then there’s the other presuppositional school that follows Cornelius Van Til. And then there’s the second approach to apologetics, which is called evidentialism. And then the third view that I espouse, which is called classical view of apologetics. There are lots of differences, Chris, and it would be unfair to try to define them absolutely in the short term, but the fundamental differences in presuppositional apologetics argues this way that the only way you can come to a sound conclusion of the existence of God is that you must begin with the assertion of God’s existence. You must presuppose the existence of God in order to have a sound argument for the existence of God. Evidentialism sees that as circular, which of course they don’t have that critique of presuppositions being circular in its reasoning process. It’s not something that one must prove or display, because for example Van Til’s defense of presuppositional apologetics, he not only admits, in fact he wouldn’t like the word admit, but he agrees that it is circular, but he says in defense of that that the nature of all arguments is circular, that the starting points and the conclusions are all bound up one with another. And what he means by that, I see two problems with that. One is if you admit that your method of proving the existence of God is circular and commits the Petit Principia fallacy in logic, then you’ve already surrendered the rationality of your position, and you’ve given the unbeliever an excuse to reject your position because you have made a logical violation in the process. Well, Van Til acknowledges circular reasoning, but he defends it by saying, as I mentioned, that it’s a particular type of circular reasoning, and in this case he commits a second informal fallacy, the one of equivocation, because the meaning of the term circular changes in the argument. He could have just as easily said that all arguments are by nature linear, that if I start with a rational starting point and come to a rational conclusion, that’s not circularity. That’s linearity. It’s the same thing if I begin with an empirical premise and come to an empirical conclusion. I’ve just remained consistent in my methodology, and there’s no sin in that.

SPROUL JR.：关于护教学，有不同的思想流派。我可以马上想到至少三种。有预设论，而且预设论也有不同的流派。有跟随戈登·克拉克的公理预设论，然后还有跟随科尼利厄斯·范·蒂尔的另一种预设论流派。然后是第二种护教学方法，叫做证据主义。第三种是我所支持的，叫做古典护教学。克里斯，差异很多，短时间内定义它们是不公平的，但预设护教学的基本区别在于，它认为你要得出神存在的合理结论，必须从神存在的断言开始。你必须预设神的存在，才能有一个合理的神存在的论证。证据主义认为这是循环论证，当然他们没有对预设论的这种循环推理过程的批评。因为例如范·蒂尔对预设护教学的辩护，他不仅承认，事实上他不喜欢用“承认”这个词，但他同意这是循环的，但他为此辩护说，所有论证的本质都是循环的，起点和结论是相互联系的。我认为这有两个问题。一个是，如果你承认你的证明神存在的方法是循环的，并且在逻辑上犯了Petit Principia谬误，那么你已经放弃了你立场的合理性，并且给了不信者一个拒绝你立场的借口，因为你在过程中犯了逻辑错误。范·蒂尔承认循环推理，但他辩护说，正如我提到的，这是特定类型的循环推理，在这种情况下，他犯了第二个非正式谬误，即模棱两可的谬误，因为在论证中“循环”一词的意义发生了变化。他本可以同样轻松地说，所有论证本质上都是线性的，如果我从一个理性的起点开始，并得出一个理性的结论，那不是循环，而是线性。如果我从一个经验前提开始，并得出一个经验结论，我只是保持了方法的一致性，这没有错。

The problem against that, evidentialism says that we present concrete empirical evidence for the existence of God, arguing from nature and so on, and also from history and the like, and that that will give you a probability quotient of conclusion that would satisfy even somebody like David Hume in terms of the astronomical probability quotient that you achieve, but that even those arguments based on empirical investigation and so on and inferences drawn from them will not get you to formal certainty, that that can only be arrived at through a logical proof that is irrefutable. But classical apologetics say that the case for the existence of God can be proven demonstrably, rationally, and formally, and compellingly. So it’s a little stronger than evidentialists who are more empirically oriented. But what I said afterwards was that that’s the way apologetics ought to be done. You don’t just say to the scientific community, well, you’re working on the wrong presuppositions or you have the wrong worldview. That’s true, but you have to begin to show them that the conclusions that they’ve drawn from their own evidence are formally invalid, which is what I heard this morning, and I thought it was magnificent.

问题在于，证据主义认为我们可以提供具体的实证证据来证明神的存在，从自然和历史等方面进行论证，这将给你一个概率结论，即使是像大卫·休谟这样的人也会满意，因为你达到了天文数字的概率，但即使是基于实证调查和从中得出的推论的论据，也不能让你达到形式上的确定性，只有通过不可辩驳的逻辑证明才能达到。但古典护教学认为，神的存在可以通过显著的、理性的、形式的和令人信服的方式证明。所以它比更注重实证的证据主义者要强一些。但我后来所说的是，这才是护教学应该做的方式。你不能只是对科学界说，你们的预设是错误的，或者你们的世界观是错误的。这是对的，但你必须开始向他们展示，他们从自己的证据中得出的结论在形式上是无效的，这正是我今天早上听到的，我觉得非常精彩。

One follow-up question is, how do we explain why classical apologetics is not equated with rationalism?

一个后续问题是，我们如何解释为什么古典护教学不等同于理性主义？

That’s to me again? How do I answer the charge? Well, you know, if I espouse to be human, that doesn’t mean I’ve embraced humanism. If I argue that I exist, that doesn’t mean that I am an advocate of existentialism, and just because a woman is feminine does not make her a feminist. We want to be rational. To be rational is to think in a sound way, and to be rational does not mean you embrace rationalism, and at the same time you have to understand that historically in the field of philosophical inquiry there have been three distinct types of rationalism. Cartesian rationalism, where rationalism is distinguished from empiricism, where the highest proof is found in the a priori categories of the mind rather than a posteriori demonstrations empirically. In that debate between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the second form of rationalism is the form you found in the Enlightenment where the rationalism was distinguished not from empiricism, but from revelation, where reason was elevated above the trustworthiness of supernatural revelation. Then the third kind of rationalism is the Hegelian rationalism of the nineteenth century, where reason is elevated to the capital R, where it is the highest reality, where reason itself becomes God. So when you call me a rationalist, I want to know what kind of rationalist you’re calling me, and I would deny all three of those and would say I’m just trying to be rational. I hope that answers it. The alternative to that is everything outside of the category of the rational is what? Irrational. We don’t want that.

又是我吗？我该如何回应这个指控呢？你知道的，如果我主张自己是人类，这并不意味着我接受了人本主义。如果我辩称自己存在，这并不意味着我是存在主义的倡导者，而一个女人有女性特质并不使她成为女权主义者。我们要理性。理性是以合理的方式思考，而理性并不意味着你接受了理性主义。同时，你必须明白，在哲学探究领域的历史上，有三种不同类型的理性主义。笛卡尔的理性主义，将理性主义与经验主义区分开来，最高的证明在于心灵的先验范畴，而不是后验的经验论证。在十七世纪和十八世纪的辩论中，第二种形式的理性主义是在启蒙运动中发现的，在那里理性主义不是与经验主义区分开来，而是与启示区分开来，理性被提升到高于超自然启示的可信度。然后，第三种理性主义是十九世纪黑格尔的理性主义，理性被提升到大写的R，成为最高的现实，理性本身成为神。所以当你称我为理性主义者时，我想知道你称我是哪种理性主义者，我会否认这三种，并说我只是试图保持理性。我希望这能回答你的问题。除此之外，理性之外的一切是什么？非理性。我们不想要那样。

Before we get to the classical view, let me mention another approach to apologetics, which has become the overwhelming majority report within Reformed theology, and that is the view of apologetics known as presuppositional apologetics. There’s more than one variety of it. There’s axiomatic presuppositionalism that was championed by Gordon Clark, but the more popular view of presuppositionalism is that that was developed by Cornelius Van Til late of Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, where he labored for several decades and who has published much in this field, and who was indeed a genuine giant and titan of the Christian faith. The book that I co-authored with John Gerstner and Lindsay, entitled Classical Apologetics, includes in one-third of that book a comprehensive critique of presuppositionalism. So because of that book that Art Lindsley and John Gerstner and I authored, we have become engaged in ongoing dialogue within the Reformed camp with respect to what is the preferred approach to doing apologetics. And Dr. Mantill, having written in the English language, which was not his native tongue, he was a native of Holland, sometimes writes in a style that is somewhat difficult to follow. And because of that, not only do his critics differ among themselves as to what he was actually saying, but also some of his most noteworthy students differ in how they interpret him. Some of his students interpret Mantill as a fitteist, whereas I think his most able interpreter, the late Gregory Bonson, did not see Mantill as a fitteist, but saw him arguing a rational case for the existence of God.

在我们讨论经典观点之前，让我提到另一种护教学的方法，这种方法在改革宗神学中占据了压倒性的多数，这就是所谓的预设护教学。预设护教学有不止一种形式，有一种是由戈登·克拉克倡导的公理预设论，但更为流行的预设论是由康奈利厄斯·范泰尔在费城的威斯敏斯特神学院发展起来的，他在那里辛勤工作了几十年，并在这一领域发表了许多著作，他确实是基督信仰中的一位真正的巨人。我与约翰·格斯特纳和林赛合著的《经典护教学》一书，其中三分之一的内容是对预设论的全面批判。因此，由于我、阿特·林斯利和约翰·格斯特纳合著的那本书，我们在改革宗阵营内就首选的护教学方法展开了持续的对话。范泰尔博士用英语写作，尽管这不是他的母语，他是荷兰人，有时他的写作风格有些难以理解。因此，不仅他的批评者在他实际所说的内容上存在分歧，他的一些最著名的学生在如何解释他的问题上也存在分歧。他的一些学生将范泰尔解释为信仰主义者，而我认为他最有能力的解释者，已故的格雷戈里·邦森，并不认为范泰尔是信仰主义者，而是认为他在为神的存在提出理性的论据。

And I’m not going to get into a lot of discussion right now about presuppositionalism, only to say by way of introduction that the presuppositional approach says this, that in order to arrive at the conclusion that God exists, in order to prove the existence of God, you must start with your primary premise, your first premise, being the presupposition of the existence of God. In other words, that unless you start by presupposing the existence of God, you will never get to the conclusion of the existence of God.

我现在不打算详细讨论预设论，只是作为介绍说，预设论的方法是这样的：为了得出神存在的结论，为了证明神的存在，你必须从你的主要前提开始，你的第一个前提是神存在的预设。换句话说，除非你从预设神的存在开始，否则你永远不会得出神存在的结论。

Now, of course, the immediate objection that is raised against that form of thinking is that that procedure of starting with the thesis that God exists and then reasoning to the conclusion that God exists involves a classic fallacy of logic called the Petitio Principii fallacy or the fallacy of circular reasoning. And the fallacy of circular reasoning occurs when the conclusion appears already in one of your premises. See, that the conclusion is already assumed up here. And so, this is a faulty form of reasoning which invalidates an argument, and that’s been the chief objection raised against presuppositional apologetics.

当然，针对这种思维方式的直接反对意见是，从神存在的论点开始，然后推理得出神存在的结论，这涉及一种经典的逻辑谬误，称为「预设前提谬误」或「循环论证谬误」。循环论证谬误发生在结论已经出现在你的前提之一中。看，这结论已经在这里被假定了。所以，这是一种无效的推理方式，使论证无效，这也是对预设护教学提出的主要反对意见。

However, the defense that Dr. Van Til gave to that, because he was certainly aware that that charge would be made against this approach, he defended it by saying that all reasoning moves in a circular fashion. Insofar as its starting point, its middle ground, and its conclusions are all involved with each other, which is to say, if you start with a rational premise and you reason consistently in a rational way, your conclusion will be of a rational sort.

然而，范泰尔博士对此的辩护是，因为他当然知道这种方法会受到这样的指责，他辩护说所有的推理都是循环进行的。因为它的起点、中间地带和结论都是相互关联的，也就是说，如果你从一个理性的前提开始，并以一致的理性方式推理，你的结论也会是理性的。

And so, with that kind of definition, Dr. Van Til justifies his use of circular reasoning saying that it’s no different from anybody else because all reasoning is circular in that sense. Well, those of us who don’t adopt this approach to apologetics find in the justification for circular reasoning the commission of a second fallacy that is as deadly as the first one. The first fallacy is the fallacy of circular reasoning, which in classic categories of logic invalidates an argument. The justification for using circular reasoning involves the second fallacy, which is the fallacy of equivocation, where a term changes its meaning in the middle of the argument. When he justifies circular reasoning by saying that all reasoning is circular in the sense that its starting point and its conclusion are of the similar sort, that’s not what is meant by circular reasoning. We’ve all understood that a rational argument, if it’s going to be rational, must be consistently rational throughout. And why call that a circle when in fact it’s linear? You begin with a rational premise, you use another rational premise, and you move and advance to a conclusion that is of a rational sort without running around in a circle. Now, granted, there is a presupposition in rational argument, the presupposition of reason, the presupposition of the law of non-contradiction, the presupposition of causality, and the other presuppositions that I’ve been setting before you in this class, including the basic reliability of sense perception and the analogical use of language. Now, those who defend Dr. Van Til here, like Greg Bonson, are saying really what Van Til is getting at here is something a little deeper than a superficial exercise in circular reasoning. What he’s saying is that if you want to assume rationality, to even assume rationality involves you out of necessity of presupposing the existence of God, because without God there is no foundation for rationality. There’s no foundation for trusting the law of causality. There’s no foundation for trusting the basic reliability of sense perception. And so, even though you don’t admit it, when you advocate reason, you are already assuming the ground of that reason, which is God Himself. So, let’s just be open and above board and say anybody who presupposes rationality is therefore presupposing the existence of God, and they’re simply disguising that. And so, I feel the weight of that because we certainly agree as classicists that it is true that if rationality is to be meaningful, and if these presuppositions of epistemology that I’m talking about are sound, then they scream for the existence of God. But that’s exactly what classical apologetics is trying to prove, that if you want to be rational, you’ve got to affirm the existence of God, because the very reason that you’re presupposing demands the existence of God. But we have to show people that, and we don’t think it’s a good strategy just to muddle the argument by saying, well, you have to start with the existence of God in your premise, in your argument in order to approve it, because then the other guy says, well, I’m going to start without the premise of God, and I’m going to end up in meaninglessness. Okay? And now what you have is a tie. And as they say, that’s like kissing your sister, and we’re not interested in that kind of experience.

因此，范泰尔博士用这种定义为他的循环推理辩护，说这与其他人的推理没有什么不同，因为所有的推理在这个意义上都是循环的。我们这些不采用这种护教学方法的人认为，为循环推理辩护实际上犯了第二个谬误，这个谬误和第一个一样致命。第一个谬误是循环推理的谬误，在经典逻辑范畴中，这使论证无效。为使用循环推理辩护涉及第二个谬误，即词义混淆的谬误，在论证过程中词义发生变化。当他通过说所有推理在某种意义上都是循环的，即起点和结论是相似的来为循环推理辩护时，这并不是循环推理的意思。我们都明白，如果一个理性论证要合理，它必须始终如一地理性。为什么称之为循环，而实际上它是线性的？你从一个理性前提开始，使用另一个理性前提，然后推进到一个理性的结论，而不是在圈子里打转。诚然，理性论证中有一个预设，即理性的预设，非矛盾律的预设，因果律的预设，以及我在这堂课上向你们展示的其他预设，包括感官知觉的基本可靠性和语言的类比使用。现在，那些为范泰尔博士辩护的人，如格雷格·邦森，说范泰尔真正要表达的是比表面上的循环推理更深层次的东西。他说，如果你想假设理性，甚至假设理性本身就需要预设神的存在，因为没有神就没有理性的基础。没有基础去信任因果律，没有基础去信任感官知觉的基本可靠性。因此，即使你不承认，当你倡导理性时，你已经在假设理性的基础，即神自己。所以，让我们坦诚地说，任何预设理性的人因此也预设了神的存在，他们只是在掩饰这一点。我感受到这一点的分量，因为我们作为经典主义者确实同意，如果理性要有意义，如果我所谈论的这些认识论的预设是正确的，那么它们就呼唤神的存在。但这正是经典护教学试图证明的，如果你想要理性，你必须肯定神的存在，因为你所预设的理性本身就要求神的存在。但我们必须向人们展示这一点，我们不认为仅仅通过说你必须在论证的前提中以神的存在为起点来证明它是一个好的策略，因为那样的话，另一个人会说，我将不以神的前提为起点，我将以无意义为结论。这样你就得到了一个平局。正如他们所说，这就像亲吻你的妹妹，我们对这种体验不感兴趣。

So, the biggest objection that I have, frankly, besides these logical errors to presuppositionalism is that nobody starts with God except God. You can’t start in your mind with God, the knowledge of God, unless you’re God. Where we say you start is with self-consciousness, and from self-consciousness you move to the existence of God. You don’t start with God consciousness and move to the existence of the self. By necessity, human beings thinking with human minds must start with where they are, with their brain. Now, the objection that comes to that is that we are capitulating to secular, pagan ideas of thought. I remember debating this point with one of the advocates of presuppositionalism in a public meeting almost thirty years ago, where this particular professor was very exercised when I said that you have to start with self-consciousness, and he said that that’s unbiblical because that what I’m doing is assuming the autonomy of the self rather than the sovereignty of God, and that this is exactly what Adam and Eve did in the Garden of Eden when they rebelled against God, and that it is a sinful, fallen, corrupt way to start reasoning by beginning with the self rather than with God. And I said to him, I would certainly agree that if my first supposition, my primary premise in reasoning was the autonomy of myself, that I would be guilty of everything you say, that I would be indeed already embracing paganism, and I could only end up if I were indeed consistent with the deification of the self and the rejection of God. But I said we don’t start with the autonomy of the self, but simply the consciousness of the self, and I reminded my friend that Augustine himself said that with self-consciousness always comes immediately an awareness of finitude, that the moment that you’re aware of yourself as a self, you know you’re not God. That’s what Calvin argued at the same time, and I’m saying that the idea of autonomy, where you’re a law unto yourself, is not contained in the idea of self-consciousness. If it were, it would indeed be sinful to start at that point.

所以，坦白说，除了这些逻辑错误之外，我对预设论最大的反对意见是，除了神自己，没有人能从神开始。除非你是神，否则你不能在你的心中从神开始，拥有对神的知识。我们说你开始的地方是自我意识，从自我意识你可以转向神的存在。你不能从神的意识开始然后转向自我的存在。必然地，人类用人类的头脑思考，必须从他们所在的地方开始，从他们的大脑开始。对此的反对意见是我们屈服于世俗、异教的思想。我记得大约三十年前在一次公开会议上与一位预设论的倡导者辩论这个问题，当时这位教授非常激动，因为我说你必须从自我意识开始，他说这是不符合圣经的，因为我假设了自我的自主性而不是神的主权，这正是亚当和夏娃在伊甸园里反叛神时所做的，是一种罪恶、堕落、腐败的推理方式，从自我而不是从神开始。我对他说，我当然同意，如果我推理的第一个假设，我的主要前提是自我的自主性，那么我确实会犯你所说的一切错误，我确实已经接受了异教，并且如果我真的一致地这样做，最终会导致自我神化和拒绝神。但我说我们不是从自我的自主性开始，而只是从自我意识开始，我提醒我的朋友，奥古斯丁自己说过，自我意识总是立即伴随着有限性的意识，当你意识到自己是一个自我时，你就知道你不是神。这也是加尔文同时所论证的，我说自主性的观念，即你是自己的法律，并不包含在自我意识的观念中。如果是这样，从这一点开始确实是罪恶的。

What we’re saying is that the beginning with self-consciousness is a given to creatureliness.

我们所说的是，自我意识的开始是受造之物的本性。

It’s the only place any self can start with their thinking. You cannot start in your mind with his thought, or with my thought, or with God’s thought. The only thing you start with is your own self-awareness, and from there you move because you are a self, and you will soon discover that you are not autonomous at all. And that’s what we’re saying, that if you begin with self-consciousness, and you reason correctly, so far from ending in autonomy, you will in fact end by necessarily affirming the existence of God.

这是任何人开始思考的唯一地方。你不能从他的思想、我的思想或神的思想开始。你唯一能开始的是你自己的自我意识，从那里出发，因为你是一个自我，你很快就会发现你根本不是自主的。这就是我们所说的，如果你从自我意识开始，并且正确推理，远非以自主结束，你实际上会必然地肯定神的存在。

The fear among presuppositionalists is that in arguing rationally and empirically that we give too much away to the pagan world, and of course the fear of the classicists for the presuppositionists is they give too much away. They give the pagan an excuse for not believing in the existence of God, because the pagan can see that their approach violates principles of rationality. But one thing we all agree on is that the construction of the existence of God is certainly the most important single premise in the building of a person’s life and worldview, and that we know that what the pagan does, according to Romans 1, is that the first lie that he embraces is the denial of the eternal power and deity of God. And then his mind becomes darkened, and the more brilliant he is, the further away he moves from that first awareness of God that he gets in nature. And so we all agree in the supreme importance of establishing early on in our apologetic the existence of God. That’s the first thing that has to be established. We agree that God is first in the order of being, obviously, but the disagreement is what comes first in the process of knowing. We say God is first in the order of being, but not first in the order of knowing.

预设论者的恐惧在于，若以理性和经验来辩论，我们会向异教世界让步太多，而经典主义者对预设论者的恐惧则是他们让步太多。他们给了异教徒不相信神存在的借口，因为异教徒可以看到他们的方法违反了理性的原则。但我们都同意，构建神的存在无疑是建立一个人生命和世界观的最重要前提，我们知道，根据《罗马书》第一章，异教徒所做的第一件事就是否认神的永能和神性。然后他的心思变得昏暗，越是聪明，他就越远离从自然中获得的对神的初步认识。因此，我们都同意在护教学中早早确立神的存在至关重要。这是必须首先确立的事情。我们同意神在存在的秩序中是第一位的，但在认识的过程中，争议在于什么是首先的。我们说神在存在的秩序中是第一位的，但在认识的秩序中不是第一位的。