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Dr. Sproul, after Dr. Meyer's talk, back here in the room, you mentioned, boy, that's great

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apologetics. And there's a question here asking an apologetical method question. Can you explain

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the difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics? And maybe elaborate

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on what you meant by even Dr. Meyer's talk and how you thought that that was a well-presented

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apologetical argument within a framework of the different schools of thought of approaching

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apologetics.

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SPROUL JR.: There are different schools of thought with respect to apologetics. I can

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think of at least three right off the bat. There's presuppositionalism, and there are

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different schools of that. There's axiomatic presuppositionalism that follows Gordon Clark,

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and then there's the other presuppositional school that follows Cornelius Van Til. And

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then there's the second approach to apologetics, which is called evidentialism. And then the

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third view that I espouse, which is called classical view of apologetics. There are lots

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of differences, Chris, and it would be unfair to try to define them absolutely in the short

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term, but the fundamental differences in presuppositional apologetics argues this

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way that the only way you can come to a sound conclusion of the existence of God is that

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you must begin with the assertion of God's existence. You must presuppose the existence

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of God in order to have a sound argument for the existence of God. Evidentialism sees that

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as circular, which of course they don't have that critique of presuppositions being circular

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in its reasoning process. It's not something that one must prove or display, because for

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example Van Til's defense of presuppositional apologetics, he not only admits, in fact he

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wouldn't like the word admit, but he agrees that it is circular, but he says in defense

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of that that the nature of all arguments is circular, that the starting points and

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the conclusions are all bound up one with another. And what he means by that, I see

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two problems with that. One is if you admit that your method of proving the existence

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of God is circular and commits the Petit Principia fallacy in logic, then you've already surrendered

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the rationality of your position, and you've given the unbeliever an excuse to reject your

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position because you have made a logical violation in the process. Well, Van Til acknowledges

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circular reasoning, but he defends it by saying, as I mentioned, that it's a particular type

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of circular reasoning, and in this case he commits a second informal fallacy, the one

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of equivocation, because the meaning of the term circular changes in the argument. He

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could have just as easily said that all arguments are by nature linear, that if I start with

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a rational starting point and come to a rational conclusion, that's not circularity. That's

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linearity. It's the same thing if I begin with an empirical premise and come to an empirical

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conclusion. I've just remained consistent in my methodology, and there's no sin in that.

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The problem against that, evidentialism says that we present concrete empirical evidence

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for the existence of God, arguing from nature and so on, and also from history and the like,

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and that that will give you a probability quotient of conclusion that would satisfy

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even somebody like David Hume in terms of the astronomical probability quotient that

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you achieve, but that even those arguments based on empirical investigation and so on

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and inferences drawn from them will not get you to formal certainty, that that can only

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be arrived at through a logical proof that is irrefutable. But classical apologetics

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say that the case for the existence of God can be proven demonstrably, rationally, and

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formally, and compellingly. So it's a little stronger than evidentialists who are more

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empirically oriented. But what I said afterwards was that that's the way apologetics ought

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to be done. You don't just say to the scientific community, well, you're working on the wrong

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presuppositions or you have the wrong worldview. That's true, but you have to begin to show

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them that the conclusions that they've drawn from their own evidence are formally invalid,

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which is what I heard this morning, and I thought it was magnificent.

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One follow-up question is, how do we explain why classical apologetics is not equated with

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rationalism?

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That's to me again? How do I answer the charge? Well, you know, if I espouse to be human,

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that doesn't mean I've embraced humanism. If I argue that I exist, that doesn't mean

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that I am an advocate of existentialism, and just because a woman is feminine does not

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make her a feminist. We want to be rational. To be rational is to think in a sound way,

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and to be rational does not mean you embrace rationalism, and at the same time you have

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to understand that historically in the field of philosophical inquiry there have been three

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distinct types of rationalism. Cartesian rationalism, where rationalism is distinguished

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from empiricism, where the highest proof is found in the a priori categories of the mind

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rather than a posteriori demonstrations empirically. In that debate between the seventeenth and

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eighteenth centuries, the second form of rationalism is the form you found in the Enlightenment

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where the rationalism was distinguished not from empiricism, but from revelation, where

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reason was elevated above the trustworthiness of supernatural revelation. Then the third

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kind of rationalism is the Hegelian rationalism of the nineteenth century, where reason is

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elevated to the capital R, where it is the highest reality, where reason itself becomes

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God. So when you call me a rationalist, I want to know what kind of rationalist you're

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calling me, and I would deny all three of those and would say I'm just trying to be

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rational. I hope that answers it. The alternative to that is everything outside of the category

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of the rational is what? Irrational. We don't want that.

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Before we get to the classical view, let me mention another approach to apologetics, which

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has become the overwhelming majority report within Reformed theology, and that is the

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view of apologetics known as presuppositional apologetics. There's more than one variety

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of it. There's axiomatic presuppositionalism that was championed by Gordon Clark, but the

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more popular view of presuppositionalism is that that was developed by Cornelius Van Til

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late of Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, where he labored for several

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decades and who has published much in this field, and who was indeed a genuine giant

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and titan of the Christian faith. The book that I co-authored with John Gerstner and

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Lindsay, entitled Classical Apologetics, includes in one-third of that book a comprehensive

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critique of presuppositionalism. So because of that book that Art Lindsley and John Gerstner

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and I authored, we have become engaged in ongoing dialogue within the Reformed camp

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with respect to what is the preferred approach to doing apologetics. And Dr. Mantill, having

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written in the English language, which was not his native tongue, he was a native of

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Holland, sometimes writes in a style that is somewhat difficult to follow. And because

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of that, not only do his critics differ among themselves as to what he was actually saying,

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but also some of his most noteworthy students differ in how they interpret him. Some of

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his students interpret Mantill as a fitteist, whereas I think his most able interpreter,

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the late Gregory Bonson, did not see Mantill as a fitteist, but saw him arguing a rational

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case for the existence of God.

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And I'm not going to get into a lot of discussion right now about presuppositionalism, only

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to say by way of introduction that the presuppositional approach says this, that in order to arrive

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at the conclusion that God exists, in order to prove the existence of God, you must start

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with your primary premise, your first premise, being the presupposition of the existence

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of God. In other words, that unless you start by presupposing the existence of God, you

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will never get to the conclusion of the existence of God.

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Now, of course, the immediate objection that is raised against that form of thinking is

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that that procedure of starting with the thesis that God exists and then reasoning to the

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conclusion that God exists involves a classic fallacy of logic called the Petitio Principii

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fallacy or the fallacy of circular reasoning. And the fallacy of circular reasoning occurs

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when the conclusion appears already in one of your premises. See, that the conclusion

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is already assumed up here. And so, this is a faulty form of reasoning which invalidates

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an argument, and that's been the chief objection raised against presuppositional apologetics.

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However, the defense that Dr. Van Til gave to that, because he was certainly aware that

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that charge would be made against this approach, he defended it by saying that all reasoning

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moves in a circular fashion. Insofar as its starting point, its middle ground, and its

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conclusions are all involved with each other, which is to say, if you start with a rational

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premise and you reason consistently in a rational way, your conclusion will be of a rational

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sort.

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And so, with that kind of definition, Dr. Van Til justifies his use of circular reasoning

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saying that it's no different from anybody else because all reasoning is circular in

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that sense. Well, those of us who don't adopt this approach to apologetics find in the justification

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for circular reasoning the commission of a second fallacy that is as deadly as the

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first one. The first fallacy is the fallacy of circular reasoning, which in classic categories

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of logic invalidates an argument. The justification for using circular reasoning involves the

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second fallacy, which is the fallacy of equivocation, where a term changes its meaning in the middle

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of the argument. When he justifies circular reasoning by saying that all reasoning is

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circular in the sense that its starting point and its conclusion are of the similar sort,

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that's not what is meant by circular reasoning. We've all understood that a rational argument,

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if it's going to be rational, must be consistently rational throughout. And why call that a circle

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when in fact it's linear? You begin with a rational premise, you use another rational

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premise, and you move and advance to a conclusion that is of a rational sort without running

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around in a circle. Now, granted, there is a presupposition in rational argument, the

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presupposition of reason, the presupposition of the law of non-contradiction, the presupposition

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of causality, and the other presuppositions that I've been setting before you in this

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class, including the basic reliability of sense perception and the analogical use of

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language. Now, those who defend Dr. Van Til here, like Greg Bonson, are saying really

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what Van Til is getting at here is something a little deeper than a superficial exercise

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in circular reasoning. What he's saying is that if you want to assume rationality, to

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even assume rationality involves you out of necessity of presupposing the existence of

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God, because without God there is no foundation for rationality. There's no foundation for

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trusting the law of causality. There's no foundation for trusting the basic reliability

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of sense perception. And so, even though you don't admit it, when you advocate reason,

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you are already assuming the ground of that reason, which is God Himself. So, let's just

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be open and above board and say anybody who presupposes rationality is therefore presupposing

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the existence of God, and they're simply disguising that. And so, I feel the weight of that because

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we certainly agree as classicists that it is true that if rationality is to be meaningful,

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and if these presuppositions of epistemology that I'm talking about are sound, then they

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scream for the existence of God. But that's exactly what classical apologetics is trying

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to prove, that if you want to be rational, you've got to affirm the existence of God,

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because the very reason that you're presupposing demands the existence of God. But we have

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to show people that, and we don't think it's a good strategy just to muddle the argument

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by saying, well, you have to start with the existence of God in your premise, in your

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argument in order to approve it, because then the other guy says, well, I'm going to start

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without the premise of God, and I'm going to end up in meaninglessness. Okay? And now

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what you have is a tie. And as they say, that's like kissing your sister, and we're not interested

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in that kind of experience.

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So, the biggest objection that I have, frankly, besides these logical errors to presuppositionalism

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is that nobody starts with God except God. You can't start in your mind with God, the

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knowledge of God, unless you're God. Where we say you start is with self-consciousness,

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and from self-consciousness you move to the existence of God. You don't start with God

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consciousness and move to the existence of the self. By necessity, human beings thinking

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with human minds must start with where they are, with their brain. Now, the objection

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that comes to that is that we are capitulating to secular, pagan ideas of thought. I remember

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debating this point with one of the advocates of presuppositionalism in a public meeting

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almost thirty years ago, where this particular professor was very exercised when I said that

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you have to start with self-consciousness, and he said that that's unbiblical because

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that what I'm doing is assuming the autonomy of the self rather than the sovereignty of

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God, and that this is exactly what Adam and Eve did in the Garden of Eden when they rebelled

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against God, and that it is a sinful, fallen, corrupt way to start reasoning by beginning

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with the self rather than with God. And I said to him, I would certainly agree that

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if my first supposition, my primary premise in reasoning was the autonomy of myself, that

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I would be guilty of everything you say, that I would be indeed already embracing paganism,

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and I could only end up if I were indeed consistent with the deification of the self and the rejection

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of God. But I said we don't start with the autonomy of the self, but simply the consciousness

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of the self, and I reminded my friend that Augustine himself said that with self-consciousness

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always comes immediately an awareness of finitude, that the moment that you're aware of yourself

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as a self, you know you're not God. That's what Calvin argued at the same time, and I'm

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saying that the idea of autonomy, where you're a law unto yourself, is not contained in the

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idea of self-consciousness. If it were, it would indeed be sinful to start at that point.

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What we're saying is that the beginning with self-consciousness is a given to creatureliness.

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It's the only place any self can start with their thinking. You cannot start in your mind

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with his thought, or with my thought, or with God's thought. The only thing you start with

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is your own self-awareness, and from there you move because you are a self, and you will

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soon discover that you are not autonomous at all. And that's what we're saying, that

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if you begin with self-consciousness, and you reason correctly, so far from ending in

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autonomy, you will in fact end by necessarily affirming the existence of God.

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The fear among presuppositionalists is that in arguing rationally and empirically that

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we give too much away to the pagan world, and of course the fear of the classicists

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for the presuppositionists is they give too much away. They give the pagan an excuse for

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not believing in the existence of God, because the pagan can see that their approach violates

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principles of rationality. But one thing we all agree on is that the construction of the

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existence of God is certainly the most important single premise in the building of a person's

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life and worldview, and that we know that what the pagan does, according to Romans 1,

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is that the first lie that he embraces is the denial of the eternal power and deity

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of God. And then his mind becomes darkened, and the more brilliant he is, the further

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away he moves from that first awareness of God that he gets in nature. And so we all

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agree in the supreme importance of establishing early on in our apologetic the existence

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of God. That's the first thing that has to be established. We agree that God is first

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in the order of being, obviously, but the disagreement is what comes first in the process

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of knowing. We say God is first in the order of being, but not first in the order of knowing.


